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I. Introduction
In 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory
opinion on the question of the "legal ties" existing between Western Sahara
and Morocco and between Western Sahara and the Mauritanian entity In its
memorials to the ICJ, Morocco advanced several arguments based on tradi-
tional Islamic legal principles and Islamic concepts of sovereignty.2 Mo-
rocco's Islamic legal arguments found their source in the traditional body and
principles of Islamic international law: the Siyar.'
1. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). In a resolution dated 13 September 1974,
the General Assembly of the United Nations asked the ICJ to issue an advisory opinion on the
following questions:
(I.) Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hara) at the time of coloni-
zation by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
(II.) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, what were the legal ties
between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian
entity?
Id at 14. For a detailed discussion of the historical background to the dispute and Morocco's
Islamic arguments before the ICJ, see infra notes 101-37 and accompanying text.
2. See Matthew M. Ricciardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical
Analysis, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 301,418 (1992) (discussing Morocco's Islamic legal arguments).
3. See Majid Khadduri, Translator's Introduction to AL-SHAYBANI, THE ISLAMIC LAW
OFNATIONS: SIAYBANI'S SIYAR 1, 19-20 (Majid Khadduri trans., 1966) (explaining that Siyar
is plural form of noun sira, which carries root meaning of"movement"). The plural form has
a general meaning of "behavior" or "way of acting." See HANS WE-R, A DICTIONARY OF
MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 447 (J. Milton Cowan ed., 1961). The specific meaning of the
conduct of the state in its relationships with other communities developed during the second
century of the Islamic era and was first popularized by Islamic jurists of the Hanafi school. See
'ABDuR RAHMAN I. Doi, SHARIrAH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 421-22 (1984).
ISLA./C BOUNDARYDISPUTES
Specifically, Morocco argued that it had established ties of sovereignty
over Western Sahara, under Islamic legal concepts of sovereignty, at the time
of Spanish colonization.4 Morocco attempted to persuade the ICJ that the
people of Western Sahara owed religious allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco
and that this religious allegiance amounted to territorial sovereignty.' Relying
on the special character of the Sherifian State, Morocco maintained that
"anyone who was a religious subject of the Sultan was ipso facto a political
subject as well."6
In its advisory opinion, the ICJ noted the special character of the
Sherifian State at the time of Spanish colonization of the Western Sahara.7 It
also recognized the religious ties between the inhabitants of Western Sahara
and Morocco.' The Court even acknowledged the allegiance of various
Western Sahara tribes to the Sultan ofMorocco.9 However, it determined that
such an allegiance, "if it is to afford indications of the ruler's sovereignty,
must clearly be real and manifested in acts evidencing acceptance of his
political authority."'1 This conclusion illustrates the ICJ's adherence to the
traditional Western legal concept of territorial sovereignty and its unwilling-
ness to give real consideration to arguments based on traditional principles of
Islamic international law.
The ICJ's unwillingness is hardly surprising. The Siyar developed over
one thousand years ago to govern the relations between the unitary Islamic
State and the non-Islamic world." Also, the Siyar relies on a concept of
sovereignty that is inherently personal rather than territorial. 2 These two
4. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 420 (analyzing Morocco's Islamic legal arguments).
5. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 42-44 (summarizing Morocco's Islamic argu-
ments); Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 420 (analyzing Morocco's Islamic legal arguments).
6. Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 420 (analyzing Morocco's Islamic legal arguments). The
term "Sherifian" indicates descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. See infra note
115 and accompanying text (defining term "Sherifian"). The Moroccan Sultans since the
sixteenth century have claimed Sherifian descent, which strengthens their claim to legitimate
religious and political leadership. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (addressing
Moroccan claim of sovereign ties between Sherifian state and inhabitants of Western Sahara).
7. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 44 (Oct. 16) (addressing and reacting to Mo-
rocco's arguments).
8. See id. (discussing common bond ofIslam existing between people ofWestem Sahara
and Morocco).
9. See id. (noting loyalties of tribes in Western Sahara).
10. Id.
11. See Christopher A. Ford, Siyar-ization and Its Discontents: International Law and
Islam's Constitutional Crisis, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 499, 505 (1995) (discussing unitary state
concept); infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text (same).
12. See Ford, supra note 11, at 506 (discussing personal sovereignty under traditional
principles of Islamic international law); Khadduri, supra note 3, at 6-7 (same); see also infra
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characteristics make the Siyar inapplicable in a world comprised of independ-
ent nation-states and governed by concepts of territorial rather than personal
sovereignty. 3 The central importance of the Siyar in the larger body of Islamic
law, however, causes an understandable reluctance among Muslim jurists to
abandonthetraditionalIslamiclegalapproachto internationalrelations. 4 Apol-
ogists attemptto show common ground between some of the general principles
found in the Siyar and the generally acceptedprinciples of Western international
law. 5 This attempt at reconciliation ultimately fails for two reasons. First, the
common ground itoffers isnotsubstantively and legitimatelyIslamic. 6 Second,
the general principles it offers are too ambiguous to offer any real guidance to
Islamic states seeking to structure their international relations. 7
This does not necessarily mean that Islamic law has no role to play in
modern international relations between Islamic states. It does, however, indi-
cate the need for a new Islamic approach to international relations that is
compatible with the world of nation-states. The scope of this Note is not so
ambitious as to attempt to offer a solution to all of the issues raised by the
Siyar's inapplicability. Instead, this Note addresses only the specific issue of
international boundary disputes between Islamic States.
Part II of this Note describes the origins, sources, and principles of the
traditional body of Islamic international law: the Siyar. To illustrate the inap-
plicability of the Siyar in modern international relations, Part III examines the
traditional Islamic legal arguments in two modern boundary disputes, as well
as the ICJ's reaction to those arguments. 8 Finally, Part IV provides a doc-
notes 39-48 and accompanying text (providing more detailed discussion ofpersonal sovereignty
under traditional principles of Islamic international law).
13. See Ford, supra note 11, at 506 (noting that, under classical formulation, "Islam found
the idea of legitimate independent legal-territorial units- let alone a nation-state on the modem
model... - wholly anathema").
14. See id. at 531-33 (discussing unwillingness of ordinary Muslims and Muslim jurists
to abandon traditional principles of Islamic international law).
15. See id. at 518 (mentioning Majid Khadduri as being especially representative of
apologist approach); see also David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public
International Law: Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L 819, 829 (1993)
(describing several ways in which Islamic scholars "attempt to reconcile Islamic authority and
Western category," including "adoption of the Western solution, the secularization of interna-
tional legal authority, and reconsideration of the traditional Islamic position, which cannot be
maintained in the contemporary world.").
16. See Westbrook, supra note 15, at 821 (criticizing attempts at reconciliation).
17. See id. (asserting that attemptto define Islamic international law and to reconcile such
definition with secular notions of public international law fail due to lack of substantively
Islamic analysis).
18. See generally Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J.
6 (Feb. 3) (providing illustration of ICJ's reaction to Islamic legal arguments); Western Sahara,
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trinal basis and justification for a new Islamic approach to boundary and
territorial disputes between Islamic nation-states.
Several key doctrines of Islamic jurisprudence suggest that it may be
possible for Islamic nation-states to import principles and arguments from the
Islamic law of property into the international arena. 9 Part IV discusses selec-
ted principles from the Islamic law of property and derives several concepts
from this body of private Islamic law that may prove useful in resolving
boundary and territorial disputes between Islamic states. The analysis con-
cludes by applying these principles to the facts of the Western Sahara case.
In addressing only this specific issue among the many issues raised by the
modem inapplicability oftheSiyar, thisNote achieves two purposes. First, and
most directly, using substantively Islamic principles, it offers a pragmatic
approachand solutionto aproblem facingmanyIslamic states seekingto resolve
boundary disputes with other Islamic states.2" Second, it demonstrates that
although seekingto replacethe now inapplicable Siyar all at once may seem an
impossible task, approaching iton an issue by issue basis mayholdreal promise
for scholars seeking to develop a workable, modem Islamic law of nations.
11. The Siyar: Traditional Islamic International Law
A. The Sources and Principles of Traditional Islamic International Law
Although the concept of an Islamic State began with the Prophet's flight
to Medina in 622 A.D., the need for an Islamic law of nations did not become
readily apparent for another century.2 After a century of rapid territorial
expansion, the emerging Islamic empire faced the question of how to govern
relations between itself and the non-Islamic world.' In the mid-eighth cen-
1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16) (same).
19. See infra notes 178-99 and accompanying text (providing basis for Islamic doctrines
ofjurisprudence).
20. See Jacques deLisle, Disquiet on the Eastern Front: Liberal Agendas, Domestic
Legal Orders, and the Role of International Law after the Cold War and Amid Resurgent
Cultural Identities, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1725, 1725 (1995) (discussing future impact of
resurgent cultural and religious identities on international law). The end of the Cold War and
the resurgence of non-Western cultural identities have posed "unfamiliar transnational prob-
lems... calling for innovative legal solutions." Id. Islamicism is part of a broader phenomenon
in which non-Western societies are beginning to demand a religious and cultural basis for
international relations. IH at 1728-30. In the face of this movement, governments of Islamic
nation-states now feel compelled to defend the religious legitimacy of their domestic and
international decisions. Id at 1736.
21. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 19 (providing historical context for development of
classical theory of Islamic law of nations).
22. See MAJID KHADDuRI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAw OF ISLAM 52 (1955) (providing
historical background for establishment of principles for relations with non-Muslim states).
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tury, the Islamic State entered its golden age under the Abbasid Caliphate, and
Muslim jurists began to address this question directly.' These eighth-century
jurists developed the Siyar as a "systematic discipline" that describes and
governs relations between the Islamic State and the non-Islamic world."
Although scholars often discuss the Siyar as if it were distinct from the
body of municipal Islamic law, no such distinction in fact exists.' All Islamic
law is based on four sources. The Quran and the Sunna form the two primary
sources.26 The two secondary sources, Uma'a (societal consensus) and qiyas
(analogical reasoning) are really means of interpreting the two primary
27sources. Because the Quran and Sunna contain few direct and explicit
references to international legal issues, the Siyar relies more heavily on qiyas
and Uma'a than do some other areas of Islamic law.28 The treatises on intema-
23. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 19 (describing Abbasid period).
24. See HUSAN KAssIM, SARAKSHI -HuGO GROTIUs OF THE MUSLIMS: THE DOCTRiNE
OF JURISTIC PREFERENCE AND THE CONcEPTs OF TREATIES AND MUTUAL RELATIONS 4 (1994)
(defining the Siyar). Sarakshi noted that the Siyar
describes the conduct of Muslims with the unbelievers of enemy territory as well
as the ones who enjoy the promise of security from the Muslims (musta'min) or the
dhimmis in the territory of Islam and with the apostates and the rebels ....
Id.
25. Cf KHADDURI, supra note 22, at46-47 (explaining that Islamic law of nations is not
separate body of Islamic law); see also Ford, supra note 11, at 500-01 (same).
26. See C.G.WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMICJURISPRUDENCE: ANINTERNATIONALPERSPECTIVE
31 (1988) (discussing sources of Islamic law). For Muslims, the Quran is the literal and
unchangeable word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Id. at 32. The Sunna is the
example of the Prophet, as represented by his combined teachings and sayings, or hadiths. Id.
at 34. The hadiths were not collected until almost a hundred years after the death of the
Prophet. Id. at 35. Compilers of hadiths followed a very systematic process in order to deter-
mine the authenticity of each individual saying. See id. at 35-39 (describing compilation of
hadiths).
27. See Bernard Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of litihad, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 199, 199-200 (1978) (discussing Islamic jurisprudence). Although Islamic law
governs all interaction between God and Man, and between Man and Man, very few specific
rules are actually spelled out in the primary sources. Id. at 199. Instead, Man must derive the
law from the appropriate sources through interpretation. Id. at 200; see also WEERAMANTRY,
supra note 26, at 32 (noting that only approximately eighty verses in Quran "deal with legal
topics in the strict sense of the term." (quoting N.J. COULSON, ISLAMIC SURVEYS: A HISTORY
OF ISLAMIC LAW 12 (1964)).
28. See Ford, supra note 11, at 501 (noting that Siyar relies more heavily on secondary
sources of Islamic law than most other areas of Islamic jurisprudence); Khadduri, supra note
3, at 19 (noting that Siyar was formed less from primary sources and more from "Islamic jurid-
ical speculation at the height of Islamic power"); see also KASSIM, supra note 24, at 45 (noting
influence of doctrine ofjuristic preference in Sarakshi's treatise on Siyar). For an example of
an area of Islamic law that relies more heavily on primary sources, see THE QURAN 4:11-13,
which provides explicit instructions regarding the laws of inheritance.
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tional law that emerged during the eighth century provided broad principles
and rules derived from the two primary and the two secondary sources.29
The classical formulation of the Siyar expresses two of its most important
characteristics. First, the Siyar is based on the concept of a unitary Islamic
State.3" Second, the Siyar relies on a concept of sovereignty that emphasizes
personal rather than territorial ties." These same two characteristics create
the biggest obstacle to the modem application of the traditional Islamic law
of nations.
The Muslim jurists who wrote the first treatises on the Siyar relied on a
polarized model of international relations. They viewed Islam as both religion
and State (din wa dawla).32 The Siyar contrasts this unitary Islamic State (dar
al-Islam) with the entire remaining non-Islamic world (dar al-Harb).33 More-
over, Islam's early universalist tendencies caused jurists to view the unitary
Islamic State as the only legitimate State." The jurists found support for this
concept in specific Quranic verses, such as: "Had your Lord pleased, He
would have united all mankind. They are still at odds, except for those to
whom your Lord has shown mercy.
35
29. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 26, at 130-31 (describing sources and characteristics
of Siyar).
30. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 53-54 (same); Ford, supra note 11, at 502 (discussing
theory of unitary state).
31. Cf Khadduri, supra note 3, at 6-7 (describing Islam's personal concept of sover-
eignty).
32. See Ford, supra note 11, at 506 (describing religious and political monism in
traditional theory).
33. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 52-53 (describing division between dar al-Harb and
dar al-Islam); Ford, supra note 11, at 502 (same). But see HASAN MONUDDIN, THE CHARTER
OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EcoNoMIc COOPERATION AMONG
ITS MEMBER STATEs 21 (1987) (arguing that there is no basis for division between dar al-Islam
and dar al-Harb in Quran and Sunna). Moinuddin argues instead that the division is a product
ofjuridical innovation during the Abbasid Caliphate. Id. at 21.
34. See KHADDURI, supra note 22, at 51 (introducing topic ofjihad). Khadduri explains
thatIslam's early followers on the Arabian peninsula "were determined to embark on aceaseless
war of conquest in the name of Islam." Id. These universalist aspirations continued until the
first major defeats of the Muslim armies at Constantinople in 717-18 and in the west at the
battle of Tours in 732. Id. at 52 & n.2. According to Khadduri, the end to Islamic territorial
expansion marked the beginning ofthe permanent conceptual division between dar al-Islam and
dar al-Harb. Id at 52. Khadduri admits that Islamic jurists recognized a permanent state of
war between the two realms. See Majid Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50
AM. J. INT'L L. 358, 359 (1956) (describing early relations between dar al-Islam and dar al-
Harb). However, he explains that this "state of war" really amounted to Islamic "non-recogni-
tion" of dar al-Harb as a legitimate State. Id. at 359-60; see also Ford, supra note 11, at 505
(describing notion that dar al-Islam was only legitimate state).
35. THEQuRANII:120.
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Whenthehaltoflslamicterritorial expansiontemperedIslam's universalist
ambitions, the Siyar evolved largelyto govemtherelations betweenthis unitary
Islamic State and the dar al-Harb.36 For example, Shaybani's famous treatise
on the Siyar contains sections on peace treaties, trade between dar al-Islam and
dar al-Harb, safe conduct, spoils of war, and the treatment of prisoners.37
However, the regulation of relations between dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb did
nothing to change the concept ofdar al-Islam as a single, unitary state."
The Siyar's concept of sovereignty relates closely to the concept of the
unitary Islamic State. First, it should be noted that under Islamic law, God is
the source of all sovereignty - personal, national, and international.39 There-
fore, any sovereignty that Man exercises is limited, as opposed to absolute,
sovereignty." Islamic law places this limited sovereign power in the hands
of the single leader of the Islamic community - the Caliph.
Islamic law is thus inherently personal rather than territorial.42 Theoreti-
cally, the only relevant tie of sovereignty is Islam, and all Muslims owe
36. See Khadduri, supra note 34, at 359 (explaining development of Siyar). Khadduri
explains that "[iln theory the Siyar was designed to be only a temporary institution, on the
assumption that Islam was ultimately to correspond to the then known world, but failure to
achieve this rendered the Siyar a permanent and an integral part of the sacred law." Id.; see also
KEADDURI, supra note 22, at 44 (same).
37. See Khadduri, supra note 3, atxvi-xviii (providing table ofcontents showing headings
of Shaybani's treatise on Siyar).
38. See Ford, supra note 11, at 506 (discussing unitary State concept).
39. See THE QURAN 67:1 (referring to God's absolute sovereignty). The Quran states:
"Blessed be He who in His hands holds all sovereignty (mulk): He has power over all things."
Id.; see also Westbrook, supra note 15, at 862 (stating that in Islamic theology, God is absolute
sovereign).
40. See MUHAMMAD HAmiDuLLAH, MUSLIM CONDUCT OF STATE 86 (1988) (discussing
Islamic concepts of sovereignty); MOINUDDIN, supra note 33, at 53 (same).
41. See Tm QURAN 4:59 (providing legal basis for Caliphate). The Quran states: "0
believers, obey God and obey the Prophet and those in authority over you." Id.; see also
ALBERT HOuRANi, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 142 (1991) (noting interpretation of this
verse by eleventh century jurist al-Mawardi); Ford, supra note 11, at 505 (discussing classical
Islamic jurisprudence of governance). Ford notes that "the Islamic community is, or should be,
not only a religious unity but also a political unity governed by a single Islamic government,
headed by the caliph .... ." Id. at 505 (quoting Fred M. Donner, The Sources of Islamic
Conceptions of War, in JUST WAR AND JIHAD: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
ONWARANDPEACEINWESTERNANDISLAMICTRADITIONS31,51 (John Kelsay & James Turner
Johnson eds., 1991)). Ford also explains the distinctions between the orthodox Sunni view of
the Caliphate, and the Shi'i view ofa Caliphate which depends on direct descent from the fourth
Caliph, 'Ali, for legitimacy. Id. at 505. However, this distinction is of little importance for the
purposes of this Note for, as Ford points out, "Shi'ite Islam is no more capable of acknowledg-
ing Islam in multiple nations than is Sunni Islam." Id. at 506; see also KHADDURI, supra note
22, at 11-13 (discussing caliphate generally); MOINUDDIN, supra note 33, at 53 (same).
42. Cf Khadduri, supra note 3, at 6-7 (describing Islam's personal concept of sover-
eignty).
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allegiance to the Caliph. Territorial, racial, ethnic, class, linguistic, cultural,
and tribal ties are irrelevant for the purpose of determining sovereignty.43
However, the limits of Islamic territorial expansion did force a recognition of
certain territorial issues." First, jurists needed the ability to determine the
territorial limits of dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb. The issue proved conten-
tious, but the classification of territory as part of dar al-Islam generally was
defined according to the freedom of Muslims living within the territory to
follow Islamic law.4' In the early days of Islam, this boundary coincided with
Islamic political authority exercised by the Caliph.
The recognition of the Islamic State's territorial limitations also raised
the issue of the status of non-Muslims living within the territorial limits ofdar
al-Islam. The Siyar generally recognized that non-Muslims who entered into
an alliance with the Islamic State and lived within its territorial boundaries
were under the sovereignty of the Islamic State to some extent.46 They were
subjects of the Caliph and enjoyed a right to internal security as well as a right
to protection from foreign attacks.47 The Siyar thus contains rules regarding
the behavior of Muslims residing within the territory ofdar al-Harb and rules
regarding the treatment of non-Muslims living within the territory of dar al-
Islam. Still, in theory, all Muslims remain under the sovereignty of the one
Islamic State, even those Muslims living outside the territorial limits of dar
al-Islam.
48
B. Historical Development
During the golden age of Islam, this traditional formulation provided a
workable basis. From the mid-eighth century A.D. until the beginning of the
tenth century (750-900), a truly unitary Islamic State existed.49 The Caliph
held all political and religious power.5" Beginning in the tenth century,
43. See Ford, supra note 11, at 505 (discussing irrelevance of these ties in comparison to
common bond of Islam).
44. Cf Khadduri, supra note 3, at 7, 11 (explaining recognition of territorial issues and
limitations).
45. See Ford, supra note I1, at 502 n. 8 (discussing definition of dar al-Islam).
46. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 11 (describing status of non-Muslims living within
borders of dar al-Islam).
47. Id.
48. See KHADDURI, supra note 22, at 44-45 (discussing Islamic legal concept of sover-
eignty).
49. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 19-21 (providing historical background concerning
golden age of Islam).
50. See Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Theory ofInternational Relations and Its Contem-
porary Relevance, in ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 24,31-32 (J. Harris Proctor ed.,
1965) (describing Caliph's authority in Islamic State).
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however, the Islamic world entered a long process of decentralization and
fragmentation.5 In 1258, the Mongol army sacked Baghdad and destroyed the
last Abbasid Caliphate.52
As the empire splintered into distinct political entities, Muslim jurists had
to re-examine the basic tenets of the Siyar.53 One group of scholars argued for
a new pluralist approach that would legitimize the political reality by recog-
nizing separate religious authorities for separate political territories.54 How-
ever, the pluralists were defeated by more orthodox jurists who were willing
to ignore the reality of decentralized political power as long as the political
leaders of the various regions continued to recognize the religious authority
of a single, central caliphate.5
This orthodox view permitted the creation and rise to power around 1300
of a Sunni Caliphate represented by the Ottoman Empire. 6 For several cen-
turies, the Ottoman Sultans maintained a degree of political authority through-
out the empire.57 They issued religious decrees based on Islamic law and even
entered into treaties with European powers. However, the growth of Euro-
pean power in the seventeenth century signaled the decline of Ottoman politi-
cal power throughout its empire.59 Political authority again became decentral-
ized, and local leaders paid mere lip service to Ottoman religious authority.'
51. See HOURANI, supra note 41, at 142-43 (describing decentralization of power under
Abbasid Caliphate); Khadduri, supra note 3, at 20-21 (providing historical background con-
ceming Abbasid period).
52. See Ford, supra note 11, at 506 (discussing fragmentation of unitary Islamic State).
53. See HOURANI, supra note 41, at 142-43 (describing impact of political fragmenta-
tion); Khadduri, supra note 3, at 21-22 (same).
54. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 21-22 (discussing pluralists' reaction to political
decentralization and fragmentation).
55. See id. (addressing leading jurists' rejection of pluralist approach and acceptance of
modified monistic theory).
56. See Khadduri, supra note 34, at 360-61 (discussing development of Muslim law of
nations during rise of Ottoman empire).
57. See id. at 360 (describing rise of Ottoman empire).
58. Id. at360-61 (discussing political and religious role of Ottoman Sultan-Caliphs). But
see HOURANI, supra note 41, at 220-21 (discussing Ottoman Caliphate). Hourani argues that
Ottoman use of the title did not indicate a claim to "the kind of universal or exclusive authority
which earlier Caliphs had been acknowledged to possess." Id. at 221. He maintains instead
that - at least initially - the title implied that the Caliph was "more than a local ruler" and that
he "used his power for purposes sanctioned by religion." Id.
59. See Khadduri, supra note 34, at 364-65 (analyzing impact of fall of Ottoman empire
on Islamic international law).
60. See YiLMAz E. ALTUG, TURKEY AND SOME PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114
(1958) (discussing gradual devolution of Ottoman authority). The dissonance between Western
and Islamic concepts of sovereignty appears in the attempts of Western scholars to define the
status of the Ottoman provinces during this process of devolution of authority in the nineteenth
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With the collapse of the Ottoman empire following the First World War, even
the fiction of a centralized religious and political authority could no longer
survive.6 In 1924, Turkey abolished the Caliphate, and Muslim jurists faced
a new dilemma in determining the applicability of the Siyar.62
C. Apologists and Critics
Twentieth century scholars have addressed this dilemma in different
ways. Some have argued for Islam's complete abandonment of international
relations in favor of secular international legal principals.63 Other scholars
have tried to reconcile the fundamental concepts of the Siyar with the princi-
ples of Western international law.' Still others have advocated a wholly new
Islamic approach to international law that will be discussed in the final
sections of this Note.65 The following subpart will discuss the views of the
apologists and critics preparatory to a discussion of the modem application of
the traditional theories in two recent international boundary disputes.
1. Apologists
In several articles and books, Majid Khadduri - one of the foremost
modem scholars of Islamic international law- attempts to reconcile elements
and twentieth centuries. lId In the early nineteenth century, Western scholars resurrected the
term "suzerainty" to describe certain limited rights exercised by a suzerain State over a vassal
State. Id. at 110. In fact, the term suzerainty "has been little used elsewhere than in connection
with the moribund Empire of the Near East." EDwIN DEWrrr DIcKINsON, THE EQUALITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (1920). Still, the international community was willing to
recognize even this extremely limited authority as amounting to sovereignty in the Western
sense in some circumstances. See Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (Fr. v. Greece), 1937 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 7 1, at 103 (Oct. 8) (finding that although Ottoman Sultan had restrictions on his
rights of sovereignty over Crete, "that sovereignty had not ceased .to belong to him"). The
Permanent Court of International Justice found that through this sovereignty, the Ottoman
empire maintained a recognizable political link to Crete and Samos. Id.
61. Cf HOURANI, supra note 41, at 315 (discussing collapse of Ottoman empire).
62. See id at 313-16 (discussing end of Ottoman Caliphate); Khadduri, supra note 34,
at 369 (same).
63. See Khadduri, supra note 34, at 369 (explaining arguments of early twentieth century
Egyptian scholar Ali Abd al-Raziq). Raziq argued that Islam was not originally designed as a
political system. Id.; see also Westbrook, supra note 15, at 829 (describing various twentieth
century responses to conflicts between traditional Islamic principles and Western international
legal system).
64. See Ford, supra note 11, at 518 (describing these efforts at reconciliation); West-
brook, supra note 15, at 821(same); see also KHADDURI, supra note 22, at 47-48 (discussing
traditional Islamic law of nations in terms of non-Islamic legal doctrine); Khadduri, supra note
3, at 7 (same).
65. See Westbrook, supra note 15, at 842 (describing views of Abd al-Hamid Abu
Sulayman).
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of the Siyar with Western international law.6" First, Khadduri maintains that
"[t]wentieth century Islam has reconciled itself completely to the Western
secular system."67 He also rejects as completely unrealistic any attempt to
resurrect the polarized system of the traditional Siyar.68 However, Khadduri
believes that the Siyar can nonetheless make a real contribution to "the devel-
opment of a peaceful and more stable world order."69
Khadduri does not detail exactly how the traditional, Islamic principles
can contribute to such a development.' 0 Instead, he speaks in terms of three
very broad contributions. First, he contends that the Islamic community's
historical experience with the problem ofmaintaininga stable public order can
serve as a useful example and model to modem nations.71 Second, Khadduri
argues that the Islamic concept of the individual as a subject of international
law can help promote the adoption of international declarations on human
rights and other personal issues.72 Finally, he argues that Islam as a way of
life emphasizes moral principles that can serve as a useful guide to interna-
tional policy makers.73
Khadduri also struggles to reconcile the sources and broad principles of
the Siyar with the sources doctrine of Article 38 of the ICJ statute.74 First,
66. See generally KHADDURI, supra note 22 (attempting to reconcile Siyar with Western
international law); Khadduri, supra note 3 (same); Khadduri, supra note 34 (same).
67. Khadduri, supra note 3, at 67.
68. See id. (stating that no Islamic scholars have "advocated the restoration of the tradi-
tional Islamic system of external relations").
69. Id. at 68.
70. See id. at 68-69 (discussing general contributions to world order, but failing to
provide specific details).
71. See id. (stating that diverse ideologies such as Islam and Christianity can coexist if
they evolve with changing circumstances).
72. See id. at 69 (noting that need exists for protection of individual in modem law of
nations).
73. See id. (asserting that system of public order must reflect moral principles to some
degree in order to retain its meaning). Khadduri is careful to note that this does not entail an
introduction of actual religious doctrine. Id.
74. See id. at 9 (stating that "the sources of the Islamic law of nations conform generally
to the same categories defined by modem jurists and specified in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice"); see also Ford, supra note 11, at 518 (describing and analyzing Khadduri's
argument). Article 38 provides that in resolving international disputes the Court shall apply:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d) subject to the provision of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
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Khadduri attempts to show that Article 3 8(1)(a)'s emphasis on the sanctity of
international treaty law is analogous to a similar Islamic formulation of the
principlepacta suntservanda.75 Second, he argues that Islamic law's reliance
on Sunna and local practice is equivalent to Article 38(1)(b)'s acceptance of
custom as a source of law. 6
This attempt to reconcile the sources of the Siyar with Article 38 illus-
trates one of the key characteristics of the apologist argument: it is essentially
reactive.7 The apologists seek to reconcile traditional Islamic legal doctrines
with modern Western legal principles. 8 Critics of this approach have been
quick to point out its basic flaws.
2. Critics
Critics find two key faults with the apologists' attempts to reconcile the
Siyar with Western international law. First, the attempts fail to provide any
specific guidance in actually resolving international disputes.79 Second, the
attempts fail to be "substantively Islamic."8 The attempts fail because it is
Statute ofthe International Court of Justice art. 38 (June 26, 1945), in 4 ACTS AND DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT 59,77 (1978) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
75. See Ford, supra note 11, at 518 (quoting KHADDURI, supra note 22, at 204) (describ-
ing Khadduri's argument regarding replication of the doctrine ofpactasuntservanda in Islamic
law). Pacta sunt servanda is a traditional Western doctrine requiring the fulfillment of treaty
obligations. d
76. See Khadduri, supra note 3, at 9 (stating that "Itihe Sunna and local practices are
equivalent to custom" ); see also Ford, supra note 11, at 522 (discussing Khadduri's argument
that "traditional Muslim doctrine accepts custom as a source of law in much the same way as
does Article 38(l)(b)"). Continuing this comparison, Ford has also analyzed the degreeto which
the Siyar is analogous to Article 38(l)(c) and Article 38(1)(d). See id. at 526-30 (discussing
similarities between these articles and principles of traditional Islamic law). Article 38(1)(c)
recognizes "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," which some scholars
have argued is equivalent to Qiyas (analogical reasoning). Id. at 525-27. Article 38(1)(d)
permits reliance on case law as a means for determining rules of law. See ICJ Statute, supra
note 74, art. 38(1)(d) (providing text of Article 38(l)(d)). Ford examines whether Islamic inter-
national law recognized an equivalent source despite its traditional refusal to permit reliance on
judicial precedent. See Ford, supra note 11, at 527-30. Ford concludes that this last compari-
son is particularly problematic and that, despite some modem tendency among Muslims to rely
on the works of publicists, "the doctrinal legacy of Islamic unitarism and universalism clearly
bars turning to non-Islamic publicists of any variety." Id. at 530.
77. See Westbrook, supra note 15, at 831-35 (describing views of Khadduri and his con-
temporary, Muhammad Hamidullah, on reconciling of Islamic and Western international law).
78. See iL at 835 (stating that "Khadduri and Hamidullah both work for the convergence
of Islamic international law on public international law").
79. See id. at 821 (arguing that apologists "fall to address the concerns of public interna-
tional law").
80. See id. (noting that apologists "fail to locate legal authority in Islam").
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impossible to reconcile the Siyar's concept of the unitary Islamic State with
the modem system of nation-states.8'
As noted above, Khadduri's apologist reconciliation provides no specific
guidance for how Islamic nation-states should or could structure their interna-
tional relations.82 Scholar David Westbrook points out that the Siyar is
"topically incomplete" for purposes of modem international relations.83 The
most important omission for the purposes of this Note is the Siyar's absolute
failure to provide any guidance for structuring relations between Islamic
nation-states."4
Westbrook also criticizes the apologist approach to reconciliation for its
failure to be "substantively Islamic."85 The apologists resolve the difficult
issues of the unitary Islamic State and the illegitimacy of non-Islamic states
by simply ignoring them. By ignoring or dismissing all of the elements of the
Siyar that conflict with Western international legal concepts, Khadduri and
other apologists advocate an Islamic international law that is, in fact, secular.86
The attempts to reconcile the sources of the Siyar with the sources
doctrine of Article 3 8 confront similar difficulties. Christopher Ford's thor-
ough analysis of this particular issue reaches the conclusion that "Islamic
approaches to the law of nations are much less congruent with secular interna-
tional law than many have supposed."" For example, Ford points out that the
Islamic version of pacta sunt servanda is far less absolute than its Western
81. Cf Ford, supra note 11, at 530-33 (asserting that Siyar remains incongruent with
modem international law). Ford concludes that "rules specifically provided to govern the
conduct of the unitary Islamic theocracy have nothing to say about the conduct of secular
territories." Id. at 531.
82. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (describing Khadduri's arguments
regarding contribution of traditional Islamic principles to international law).
83. See Westbrook, supra note 15, at 857 (noting problems arising from Siyar's polarized
approach). Westbrook mentions several issues that the Siyar fails to address, including:
"resource extraction by a technologically sophisticated state from a poor state;" the protection
of intellectual property; relations between "Islamic states and the rest of the developing world;"
and the regulation of "affairs among Muslim states." Id.
84. See MonmDDIN, supra note 33, at 15 (stating that "[t]he scope of the Siyar... did
not include the external conduct of the Muslim State vis-a-vis other Muslim States").
85. See Westbrook, supra note 15, at 821 (asserting that scholars who have attempted to
reconcile Siyar with secular international law have failed to provide Islamic legal basis for their
arguments). In fact, Westbrook argues that Khadduri's attempted translation of the Siyar into
Western idiom is so complete as to be virtually indistinguishable from Western public interna-
tional law. Id. at 832.
86. See id. at 835 (summarizingKhadduri's and Hami dullah's views as toSiyarand public
international law). Not surprisingly, Westbrook finds this conclusion extremely problematic.
Id. Posing the question: "what is a secular Islamic polity?" Westbrook responds that according
to many scholars it is anathema. Id.
87. Ford, supra note 11, at 530.
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counterpart. 88 First, under the Islamic doctrine, non-Muslims possess only
a temporary power to make treaties.89 Second, the Islamic concept does
not contain principles of equality and reciprocity because of the belief that
the only legitimate State is the unitary Islamic State.9° Finally, only the
Caliph may enter treaty obligations with non-Islamic states and then only on
behalf of the entire unitary Islamic State.91 Ford provides equally convincing
criticisms of the other attempts to reconcile the sources of the Siyar with
Article 3 8.'
Ford attributes the inability of scholars to reconcile the Siyar with
Western public international law to the Siyar's fundamental constitutional
crisis.93 It is a crisis that has lingered since the initial fragmentation and
decentralization of the Islamic State.9' For much of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries, the crisis remained out of the limelight because jurists removed
the debate to "the ivory tower of legal scholarship."" During this period,
jurists and Muslims in general simply deferred to the judgment of secular,
national leadership.96
However, the growing resurgence of Islamism during the second half of
the twentieth century has made it impossible to ignore the issue any longer.97
Leaders of Islamic nation-states now feel compelled to show that their actions
88. See id. at 518-22 (discussing role of precedent in Islamic jurisprudence).
89. See id. at 520 (discussing nature of obligations in treaty law under Siyar). Ford points
out that according to the traditional Islamic doctrines, treaties made with non-Muslims were
only temporary, "subject to dissolution the moment Islam's conquest could profitably be
resumed." Id.
90. See id. (addressing recognition of non-Islamic states in treaty law under Siyar).
According to Ford, the fundamental basis of Western treaty law is the assumption that treaties
take place "between sovereigns on the basis of equality and reciprocity." Id. The universalist
aspects of the Siyar simply cannot permit such a basis for treaties between non-Muslims and the
Islamic State.. Id.
91. See id. (discussing treaty law in Quran and Sunna). Ford examines the Sunna and
Quran and concludes that the treaties in the primary sources were "clearly predicated upon
Muhammad's captaincy of all Islam." Id.
92. See id. at 518-33 (discussing generally compatibility of Siyar with sources doctrines
of Article 38).
93. See id. at 530-31 (addressing conflict between classical Islamic legal traditions and
modem international principles). This constitutional crisis is the inability of Muslim jurists to
reconcile the essential teachings of Islam with the actions of a given region's secular rulers. See
id. at 530 (describing Siyar's constitutional crisis).
94. See id. at 530 (describing origins of Islam's constitutional crisis).
95. See id. at 525 (analyzing jurists' response to Islam's constitutional dilemma).
96. See id. at 524-25 (arguing that Siyar has "renounce[d] any ability to second-guess the
legitimacy of the actions of those in authority").
97. Cf. deLisle, supra note 20, at 1725-30 (discussing impact of Islamicism and other
cultural and religious movements on international law).
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and leadership have religious legitimacy." A growing group of Muslim jurists
has called for the reintroduction of Islamic legal principles in the regulation
of international relations." However, the traditional Islamic legal principles
governing international relations simply are not workable in the modem world
of nation-states. The Siyar cannot address the issue of relations between
distinct Islamic nation-states because it does not admit the possibility of dis-
tinct Islamic nation-states.
Nonetheless, Islamic nations have formed arguments using elements and
principles of the traditional Islamic law of nations in boundary and territorial
disputes during the past two decades."° Part III of this Note describes two
such disputes before the ICJ in which parties used Islamic legal arguments
based on concepts from the traditional Islamic law of nations. It also shows
that in both cases the Court demonstrated an unwillingness to accept these
traditional arguments.
Il. The Siyar Applied: Traditional Islamic Arguments and the ICJ
A. Western Sahara
The Western Sahara is a piece of territory at the western edge of the
Sahara desert roughly half the size of France.1"' It borders Morocco to the
north, Mauritania to the east and south, and the Atlantic to the west. 2 Spain
first established control over the region by proclaiming a protectorate over Rio
de Ora in 1884.3 Atthe time of Spain's colonization, Muslim nomads inhab-
ited the region, pastured their animals, and grew crops "as and where condi-
tions were favourable."' 4 In the 1960s and early 1970s, Spain still controlled
the Western Sahara, but both Morocco and Mauritania had made legal claims
98. See id. at 1736 (describing efforts of governments in Islamic world to appear reli-
giously legitimate); See also HOURANI, supra note 41, at 452-58 (discussing growing impact of
Islamic political movements on regional politics since 1967).
99. deLisle, supra note 20, at 1736.
100. See infranotes 112-20, 164-67 and accompanying text (describingtraditional Islamic
arguments in two territorial disputes).
10 1. JOHN DAMuS, CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN SAHARA DIsPuTE I
(1983) (describing territory).
102. See id. (describing geography of Western Sahara). The territory also borders Algeria
to the northeast for approximately 26 miles. Id.
103. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 38 (Oct. 16). Spain established the borders of the
territory in agreements with Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria between 1886 and 1912. See
Tony Hodges, Introduction to WAR AND REFUGEES: THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT 1, 2
(Richard Lawless & Laila Monahan eds., 1987) (discussing creation of borders and roots of
conflict). However, Spanish troops did not establish full control over the entire region until
1934. Id. In fact, Spain never had a substantial presence in the territory and only established
a formal administration in 1963. See DAMIS, supra note 101, at 12 (providing historical .back-
ground of Spanish control of Western Sahara).
104. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at41 (detailing characteristics of territory's inhabit-
ants at time of Spanish occupation).
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to the territory. 5 Also, in 1973, the Algerian-backed Polisario Front began
a movement for independence in the region, and Spain announced its intention
to decolonize the territory."°
In a letter dated 17 December 1974, the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the Western Sahara
question in order to assist the UN General Assembly in forming its policy
regarding decolonization of the territory." 7 The United Nations requested an
answer to two questions:
I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
H. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, what were the legal
ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauri-
tanian entity?'0 '
105. See id at 26 (describing prelude to conflict).
106. See DAMS, supra note 101, at 50-56 (recounting historical background to dispute).
107. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 13, 27, 36. Unfortunately, the ICJ advisory opinion
did not lead to a peaceful decolonization of the territory. After the ICJ announced its decision,
King Hassan of Morocco proclaimed the decision a vindication of Moroccan claims. DAMIS,
supra note 101, at 60. The King organized the famous "Green March" in which 350,000
Moroccan volunteers crossed the border into Western Sahara. Id. at 60-61. This bold move
prompted the Spanish government to enter into negotiations with Morocco and Mauritania for
the transfer of Western Sahara. Id at 65-66. Spain agreed to withdraw from Western Sahara by
February 28, 1976. Id. at 67. The parties completed the transfer on January 12, 1976. Id. at 70.
By separate agreement in 1976, Mauritania and Morocco agreed to divide the territory. Id. at 76-
78. Morocco occupied the northern two-thirds of the territory, and Mauritania occupied the
southern third, consisting ofthe southernmostprovince. Id The Polisario rebels continued their
struggle for independence against both the Moroccan and Mauritanian forces. Id. at 82-85. In
1979, Mauritania concluded a peace treaty with the Polisario and withdrew from the southern-
most province. Id at 84-89. Morocco then occupied the entire territory of the Western Sahara.
Id at 84-89. Fighting between the Polisario rebels and Moroccan troops has continued sporadi-
cally since that time. See Stephen Hughes, Western Sahara Settlement Still out of Sight After
Fifteen Years, REUTERS,Nov. 6,1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arenws File (alluding
to fighting between Polisario and Morrocan forces until 1988). In 1986, afiermany unsuccessful
attempts to mediate a solution to the sovereignty question, Morocco made new efforts to reach
a solution and asked the United Nations to administer a referendum on the issue. New U.N. Bid
to End Dispute Over Western Sahara, REUTERS, Apr. 9, 1986, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File. After many preliminary negotiations, the Secretary General presented a
plan for the referendum in April 1991, in which the inhabitants of the region would choose
between integration with Morocco and independence. See Thomas Lippman, Western Sahara's
Long Stalemate, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 5, 1995, at 1 (discussing efforts to develop plan for
referendum). Disputes over registration of eligible voters in the region and other issues continue
to delay the administration ofthe referendum. See PressDigest, REuTERs WORLD SERvICE, Feb.
1, 1997, available inLEXIS,News Library, CumwsFile (reporting announcementbyU.N. chief
Kofi Annan that referendum process in Western Sahara has stalled). Meanwhile, when Algeria
ceased funding the Polisario Front in the early 1990s, the group dwindled to a mere handful of
fighters operating from a single base across theAlgerian border. See Philip Finnegan, Terrorism
Changes North African Spending Priorities, DEF. NEWS, Jan. 20, 1991, at 3 (noting that, after
Algeria cut funds to Polisario rebels, Morocco effectively won war).
108. WesternSahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 14. TheICJ interpreted "legal ties" to mean "such 'legal
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The letter asked the governments of Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, and any
other interested parties to submit information that could help the Court to
clarify the question." 9 Morocco and Mauritania both submitted arguments
claiming sovereignty over the territory. Algeria also submitted arguments in
favor of self-determination as the governing principle in the decolonization
process.'"0 Of these three Islamic states, Morocco put the most emphasis on
traditional Islamic concepts regarding sovereignty and international law."'
Morocco argued that the territory of the Western Sahara was not terra
nullius at the time of Spanish colonization because Morocco had established
ties of sovereignty over the territory at the time of Spanish colonization under
Islamic legal concepts of sovereignty."' Specifically, Morocco attempted to
persuade the Court to recognize the sovereign ties between the Sherifian State
of Morocco and the inhabitants of Western Sahara-ties of sovereignty based
not on the Western concept of territorial sovereignty, but on the Islamic
concept of the personal, religious allegiance of the inhabitants to the Sultan
of Morocco."'
First, Morocco argued that the people of the Western Sahara had come
under Islamic control around the time of the Islamic conquest of North Africa
during the seventh century A.D."4 The inhabitants of the region had therefore
been Muslims since the seventh century, and the territory belonged to dar al-
Islam. Morocco then advanced arguments regarding the special character of
the Sherifian State."' The Kingdom argued that by nature of the Moroccan
royal family's direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad, the Sherifian State
was founded and based on the common religious bond of Islam and on the
ties' as may affectthe policy to be followed in the decolonization of Western Sahara." Id. at 41.
109. See id. at 14 (quoting letter from UN General Assembly).
110. See id. at 30 (summarizing Algeria's argument).
111. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at418-19 (discussing Islamic legal arguments in Western
Sahara dispute).
112. See id. at 420 (analyzing Morocco's Islamic arguments in Western Sahara case).
113. See George Joffd, The International Court of Justice, and the Western Sahara
Dispute, in WARAND REFUGEES: THE WESTERN SAHARA CoNFLICT, supra note 103, 16,21-23
(discussing various concepts of sovereignty in Western Sahara case); see also Ricciardi, supra
note2, at420 (discussingMorocco's invocation of"Islamicconceptofthe State"). TheMoroccan
sultanate was somewhat of an anomaly in Islamic history. The first Moroccan Sultan claimed
the Caliphate upon the collapse of the Ummayad Caliphate. Joff6, supra, at 26. It maintained
a separate territorial sphere of influence in western North Africa and remained independent of
the Ottoman empire. Id.
114. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12,42 (Oct. 16) (summarizing Morocco's arguments
in support of its claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara).
115. See id. at 43-44 (discussing Morocco's claim that "the Court should take account of
the special structure of the Sherifian State"). The term "Sherifian" signifies descent from the
family oftheProphetMohammad. See HOURAIsupra note 41, at 115 (defining term "Sherif').
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religious allegiance of the people, including the people of Western Sahara, to
the Sultan of Morocco.'
1 6
Under traditional principles ofIslamic law, these arguments should have
sufficed to establish sovereignty." 7 The territory in question was part of dar
al-Islam, and the Sultan of Morocco was the legitimate religious leader to
whom the inhabitants of the region pledged and owed their religious alle-
giance. "8 In the Islamic State, religion unifies all people under one sovereign
authority." 9 Even those areas of Western Sahara in which the Sultandid not
exercise direct political authority were still under Moroccan sovereignty by
nature of the Sultan's religious legitimacy. 2
The Court noted the special significance of the Sultan's religious author-
ity and descent from the Prophet, but it refused to recognize such religious
authority as a tie amounting to sovereignty.12 1 The Court rejected Morocco's
arguments because they did not coincide with the traditional Western interna-
116. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 44 (describing "special character" of Sherifian
State at time of Spain's occupation of Western Sahara); see also HOURANI,supra note 41, at 115
(noting that, from sixteenth century onwards, ruling dynasties in Morocco "have based their
claim to legitimacy" on their Sherifian descent).
117. See Joffd, supra note 113, at 26 (noting that under Islamic law allegiance of inhabit-
ants of Western Sahara to Sultan "did provide a basis for political sovereignty-through control
of community, rather than territory").
118. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (discussing Islamic concept of sover-
eignty); see also DAMS, supra note 101, at 19-20 (discussing Islamic concept of sovereignty).
The tribes of Western Sahara offered formal pledges of allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco
before and during Spanish occupation of the territory in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Iat at 19. This pledge signified Moroccan sovereignty over the inhabitants and the
territory: "The Moroccan sultan was commander of the faithful, the steward of God on earth
for all matters, religious or secular. Since the sultan personified both state and church, Moroc-
cans argue that ties of personal allegiance from certain tribes to the sultan cannot be differenti-
ated from ties of territorial sovereignty." Id.
119. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text (discussing concept of unitary Islamic
State).
120. See Joffl, supra note 113, at 26-27 (discussing Islamic concepts of sovereignty in
Morocco's arguments). Joff6 points out that even in the regions outside the Sultan's direct
control (bilad al-siba), the Sultan provided legitimization for local authorities and played a
limited role as an arbitrator. Id. at 27. According to Islamic doctrine, this delegation and
legitimization of local political authority in no way lessened the Sultan's sovereignty and was
especially appropriate in those areas of dar al-Islam that bordered on dar al-Harb. Id.; see also
DAMIS, supra note 101, at20 (noting tribes' recognition of Moroccan Sultan's authority inSiba
land, but rejection of Sultan's various administrative controls).
121. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.L 12,44 (Oct. 16) (responding to Morocco's arguments
and discussing difference between allegiance and sovereignty). The Court even concluded that
there was a "legal tie of allegiance" between the Sultan and some of the Western Saharan tribes
but that it did not amount to a "legal tie of territorial sovereignty." Id at 56-57; see also DAMIS,
supra note 101, at 59-60 (discussing ICJ's opinion in Western Sahara case).
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tional legal principle of territorial sovereignty. ' According to the Court, terri-
torial sovereignty requires a showing of effective political control over the
territory in question." This political control mustbereal andmanifested in acts
that demonstrate its acceptance by the inhabitants of the territory. 24 Under this
more demanding and objective Westerntest, the CourtdeterminedthatMorocco
failed to establish evidence sufficient to support its claims of sovereignty."z
Individual judges expressed more decisive views on the issue. In his
separate opinion, Judge De Castro rejected Morocco's Islamic arguments out-
right and openly criticized Morocco for failing to frame its arguments accord-
ing to traditional Western legal theories regarding the acquisition of terri-
tory. 26 However, two judges on the Court asserted that Morocco's Islamic
arguments should have received more attention. Judge Ammoun, in his
separate opinion, argued that Ireland, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all provided
examples of nation-states built on the strength of religious ties.127 In another
separate opinion, Judge Boni - the ad hoc judge appointed by Morocco -
recognized the Sultan's dual religious and political authority over the people
of Western Sahara, but despite this belief, voted with the majority because he
agreed that the inhabitants of the region should be consulted on the matter of
their own sovereignty. 2
122. See Joffd, supra note 113, at 27 (providing explanation of ICJ's decision).
123. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at44 (explaining requirements of territorial sover-
eignty).
124. See id. (stating that, although "[p]olitical ties of allegiance to a ruler... have
frequently formed a major element in the composition of a State," such ties "must clearly be real
and manifested in acts evidencing acceptance of his political authority").
125. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 421 (discussing ICJ's test for determining ties of
sovereignty).
126. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 153 (separate opinion of Judge De Castro) (ques-
tioning Morocco's refusal to frame its argument in terms of conquest cession, or occupation).
Judge De Castro maintained that, if Morocco wanted to demonstrate that Western Sahara was
incorporated in the Sherifian State of Morocco, it should have shown that its occupation of the
territory was effective. Id (separate opinion of Judge De Castro). Moreover, he noted that this
required "more than a vague animuspossidendi, and 'right of proximity' or the fact of belong-
ing, like Morocco, to the Dar al-Islam." Idl at 154 (separate opinion of Judge De Castro).
127. See id. at 98 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun) (recognizing some validity in
Morocco's Islamic arguments). Judge Ammoun even quoted a turn of the century French
ambassador to Spain who said:
It has always been recognized that the territorial sovereignty of the Sultan [of
Morocco] extends as far as his religious suzerainty, and as it is beyond doubt that
the peoples of Cape Juby are subject to him from the religious point of view, we
could consider his sovereignty as indisputable.
Id. at 98-99 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun) (citing Paul Cambon, Documents Diplo-
matiques Francais, 1871-1914, first series, Vol. VIII).
128. See id. at 173-74 (separate opinion of Judge Boni) (arguing that Court gave insuffi-
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The Islamic legal arguments probably appeared foreign to many of the
judges on the Court, and it is possible that they failed to understand them
fully. '29 It is also possible that the Court rejected the Islamic concept of sover-
eignty because it feltthat "reliance upon subjective perceptions of sovereignty
would create insurmountable problems of proof."30 Some scholars also
believed that the Court made a decision to endorse an "unimpeachable right
of self-determination."'
3 1
The presence of the Western legal principle of self-determination compli-
cates an analysis of the Court's reaction to Morocco's Islamic arguments.
Self-determination has enjoyed a paramountcy over historical, cultural, and
religious claims in the UN since 1960.32 Two policy considerations underlie
this preference for self-determination. 3 First, an assumption exists that any
other policy might lead to endless conflicts, especially in former colonial
territories.1 4 Second, it is assumed that even nation-states with arbitrarily
delimited boundaries will "soon develop a cohesive logic of their own.' 35
Recent events in Africa call into question the validity of these two
underlying assumptions. 3 6 Yet, many disputes regarding the delimitation of
cient attention to religious ties between Western Sahara and Sultan of Morocco). Judge Boni
noted that for the inhabitants of Western Sahara,
the Sultan was Commander of the Faithful, that is to say, the Steward of God on
earth for all matters, whether religious or not. He was thus regarded not only as
religious leader but as director of their temporal affairs. The legal ties between
them were thus not only religious - which no one denies - but also political, and
had the character of territorial sovereignty.
Id. at 173 (separate opinion of Judge Boni).
129. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 421 (discussing Court's opinion and concluding that
"[flor all the Court's professed willingness to consider special conditions and accept non-
European models of the State, the Court adhered to the existing dual requirement of the inten-
tion to act as sovereign and the display of outward, objectively observable signs of sovereign
authority").
130. Id. at 422.
131. See DAMIS, supra note 101, at 60 (discussing reaction to Western Sahara opinion).
132. See Thomas M. Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 697-98
(1976) (criticizing UN's approach to Western Sahara dispute and detailing UN self-determina-
tion policy prior to Western Sahara dispute).
133. Id. at 698.
134. Id
135. Id.
136. See Scott Straus, Zaire's Rebels Change Region's Calculus, HOuS. CHRON., Dec. 1,
1996, at Al (discussing recent developments in central Africa). Almost all of Africa's current
national boundaries were delimited artificially by the European powers at the end of the
nineteenth century. Id. Many political scientists fear that recent secessionist and tribal up-
risings in central Africawill lead eventually to a complete breakdown of the continent's current
national boundaries. Id
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disputed boundaries may not even raise the issue of self-determination.
Clearly, self-determination played a significant role in the Western Sahara
dispute. The question whether a comparable concept exists within Islamic law
goes beyond the scope of this Note.
It may be more likely that the Court simply recognized the inherent
contradiction in Morocco's arguments. Morocco argued in a forum of nation-
states - a system based on the concept of territorial sovereignty. Yet Morocco
used arguments based on a system that recognized only one legitimate state
and ties of sovereignty based on personal religious belief. 37 This contradic-
tion, and the Court's reaction to it, reappeared almost two decades later in a
boundary dispute between Libya and Chad.
B. Libya and Chad
The Aouzou strip is a 45,000 square mile strip of land on Chad's northern
border with Libya.' As in the Western Sahara case, the dispute over owner-
ship of the territory arose after Western decolonization of the region. French
forces in Algeria began expanding French control into the Sahara around
1851.139 An 1890 Anglo-French declaration paved the way for French occupa-
tion and control over Chad by the beginning of the First World War. 4' Chad
became a member of the French community in 1958 and an independent state
in 1960.'
Italian troops invaded and occupied Libya in 1911, hoping to establish
their own North African colonial possession. 142 Resistance by Libyan free--
137. See Joffd, supra note 113, at 27 (describing contradiction inherent in Morocco's
argument). Joff6 states that
the Moroccan argument rested on a necessary contradiction in that the reality it
attempted to describe was a historical situation defined originally and given legal
force under Islamic law through constructs related to communal links, but the terms
in which it did this were those of a legal justification relating to territorial control,
as international legal practice demands.
Id.
138. See Roger Cohen, Chad Wins World Court Decision in Territorial Dispute with
Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1994, at A6 (discussing boundary dispute between Chad and Libya).
Although the strip itself is only 45,000 square miles, Libya claimed an additional 310,000
square miles of territory in Chad south of Aouzou strip itself. Id.
139. See JoHN WRIGHT, LIBYA, CiAD ANDTHE CENTRAL SAHARA 112-13 (1989) (describ-
ing French expansion in region).
140. See id. at 114-17 (describing French advances in Africa prior to World War I).
141. See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 17 (Feb.
3) (describing Chad's accession to independence).
142. See WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 119 (providing historical background concerning
Italian occupation of Libya).
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dom fighters continued through the early 1930s." 3 After the Second World
War, Allied forces administered the former Italian colony until it became a
sovereign state in 1951." In 1955, Libya concluded a treaty with France
delimiting the boundary between Libya and what was to become Chad and
placing the Aouzou strip under Chad's control. 5
In 1973, a Libyan army crossed the southern border into Chad and
occupied the Aouzou strip, claiming it and additional territory in Chad extend-
ing south to the Fifteenth Parallel.'46 After an unsuccessful invasion of
Chad's territory south of the Aouzou strip in 1979, Libya remained in occupa-
tion of the Aouzou strip, and fierce fighting between the two countries contin-
ued throughout the 1980s. 7 In August of 1990, Chad and Libya agreed to
take the dispute before the ICJ for a binding decision.'
In an exhaustive analysis of the dispute written shortly before the ICJ
decision, Matthew Ricciardi examined Libya's possible Islamic legal claims
to the Aouzou strip.'49 In fact, Libya did raise Islamic legal arguments. How-
ever, the arguments were even broader and less focused than those raised by
Morocco in the Western Sahara dispute. 5 ' Perhaps this lack of clarity was
partly due to Libya's weaker claim to legitimate religious authority over the
people of the Aouzou strip. Whereas the Moroccan government could point
to the legitimacy of the Moroccan Sultan by reason of his Sherifian descent,
the Libyan government had to rest its claims on the authority of the Sanusi
brotherhood and through it the much more remote and questionably legitimate
religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph at the turn of the century.'
143. Id
144. See Libya v. Chad, 1994 I.C.J. at 17 (discussing Allied administration of Libya);
WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 122-24 (same).
145. See Libya v. Chad, 1994 I.C.J. at 19-28 (discussing 1955 boundary agreement).
146. See Key Events in Recent Libyan History, REUTERS, Aug. 29, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (describing Libyan invasion of territory).
147. See Cohen, supra note 138 (discussing military conflict between Libya and Chad).
148. See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 8-9
(Feb. 3) (providing details of submission of dispute for resolution); see also Chad Awarded
Disputed Aouzou Strip, Libya Silent, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Feb. 3, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (noting that both Chad and Libya agreed to honor ICJ's
ruling).
149. See generally Ricciardi, supra note 2.
150. Memorial Submitted by Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Sept. 26,
1991, vol. 1, at 7 (arguing for non-Western concept of sovereignty). For example, Libya asked
that the Court consider the meaning of their claims to the territory in light of"the rather differ-
ent concepts of the Ottoman empire based on Muslim precepts from those of the European
Powers as to sovereignty and territorial boundaries." Id
151. Id. at 473 (making arguments based on Ottoman sovereignty over disputed territory).
Libya argued that
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Islamic influence in what is now Libya began as early as the seventh
century A.D. By the mid-sixteenth century, Tripoli was one of three Ottoman
capitals in the Maghrib.'52 After only half a century, however, the central
Ottoman government lost direct political control of Tripoli to local military
leaders.' In response to growing European involvement in North Africa, the
Ottomans reasserted direct political and military control of Libya in 1835.
They maintained direct control of Tripoli from 1835 until the Italian invasion
in 1911.54
In 1843, as the Ottomans reasserted control over Tripoli and the Libyan
coastal regions, an Islamic reform movement called the Sanusi brotherhood
(Sanusiyya) emerged in the Cyrenaica region of what is now Libya. 5 The
Sanusiyya expanded its influence south into the disputed territory of the
Aouzou strip, spreading the message .of Islamic reform and establishing
political control. 5 An uneasy relationship existed between the Ottomans in
Tripoli and Istanbul and the Sanusi leaders in Cyrenaica and southern Libya.
The rise of the Sanusiyya coincided with the Ottoman Sultan's increased
emphasis on his role as the defender of the Islamic State.'57 Many scholars
saw this renewed emphasis as an attempt to reassert political control over the
dissolving empire by waving the banner of pan-Islamism. 5 ' It served the
Ottomans' purpose, therefore, to accede to Sanusi political control over the
region and to allow Sanusi leaders to strengthen Islamic feeling in southern
Libya as a means of combating French encroachment from the south.159
a parallel and compatible title resided in the Ottoman empire, since the borderlands
lay within the territories claimed by the Ottoman empire on the basis of religious,
legal, cultural and commercial ties, going back a long time, and confirmed by their
presence and understandings with the indigenous peoples.
Id.
152. See HOURANI, supra note 41, at 228 (discussing Ottoman control in Maghrib). Tunis
and Algiers were the capitals of the other two provinces in the Maghrib under Ottoman control.
Id.
153. See id. (discussing Ottoman control in Maghrib).
154. See WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 112 (describing reassertion of Ottoman political
control over Tripoli).
155. See id. at 81 (discussing rise of Sanusiyya in Libya); see also HOURANI, supra note
41, at 312 (same).
156. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 341-42 (explaining that Sanusiyya's move southward
was attempt, in part, to avoid direct political control of Ottomans in Tripoli).
157. See HouRAN, supra note 41, at 313-14 (discussing Ottoman reaction to European
encroachment). Hourani argues that this renewed emphasis on the Sultan's religious role as
Caliph served "both as a rallying cry to Muslims in the empire and outside to gather around the
Ottoman throne, and a warning to European states which had millions of Muslim subjects." l
158. See id. (noting political motives and political impact of these attempts).
159. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 344 (discussing interaction between Ottoman govern-
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The Ottoman Sultan-Caliph remained the nominal religious authority for
the entire region, although "spiritual supremacy was about the limit of the
allegiance" that the Sultan could exact from the Saharan tribes.16 The Sanu-
siyya and the southern tribes paid lip service to the Sultan's religious role as
Caliph.16" ' However, they rejected the Ottoman Sultan's attempts to reassert
imperial political control through increased emphasis on his pan-Islamic relig-
ious role as Caliph. In fact, the Sanusi leadership was at times openly hostile
to Ottoman claims of universal Islamic religious authority. 62 The fact that the
founder of the Sanusi movement claimed Sherifian descent further compli-
cated the question of legitimate religious authority in the disputed region."
Before the ICJ, Libya argued that, at the time of the Italian invasion, the
inhabitants of the disputed territory owed allegiance to the Sanusiyya.164
Libya further argued that the Sanusiyya fought French and later Italian en-
croachments on that territory and that they carried out this struggle on behalf
of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph and under his sovereignty. 5 In some ways this
claim is analogous to Morocco's claim in the Western Sahara dispute.166 The
Moroccan Sultan enjoyed religious allegiance from the people of Western
Sahara, but left direct political control in the region to local leaders. Simi-
larly, the Ottoman Sultan received nominal religious allegiance from the
people of the Aouzou strip while the Sanusiyya exercised direct control and
played an active role in opposing European encroachment on the Sultan's
behalf.67 As Ricciardi points out, this argument did not succeed for Morocco
in the Western Sahara dispute.'68 On its face, Morocco's claim appeared
stronger than Libya's both because of the Moroccan Sultan's stronger claim
ment and Sanusiyya).
160. See WRIGHT, supra note 139, at 112 (noting limits of Ottoman control over tribes).
Wright also states that this respect for the Ottoman Caliph's religious authority "in no way
implied acceptance of his imperial sovereignty." Id. at 116.
161. See id. (describing extent of allegiance of southern tribes to Ottoman Sultan-Caliph).
162. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 342 (analyzing interaction between Sanusiyya and
Ottoman authority). Ricciardi attributes the Sanusiyya 's hostility to the Ottomans at least in part
to the Sanusi belief that the Ottomans were not pious Muslims. Id
163. Cf id. at 341 (explaining Sanusi leader's Sherifian descent).
164. See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyav. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 13 (Feb.
3) (summarizing Libya's arguments in support of its claim to Aouzou strip).
165. See id at 13, 16 (outlining Libya's claim to disputed territory through inhabitants'
allegiance to Sanusiyya).
166. See Ricciardi, supra note 2, at 424 (comparing Libya's arguments in support of its
claim to Aouzou strip with Morocco's arguments in Western Sahara case).
167. See id (discussing religious allegiances and political control of people in Western
Sahara and Aouzou strip).
168. See id. (noting ICJ's rejection of Morocco's Islamic argument).
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to legitimate religious authority and because of the stronger ties between the
Moroccan Sultan and local authorities in Western Sahara.'69 Ricciardi raised
the possibility, however, that the changed composition of the Court since the
Western Sahara.dispute might provide a more receptive forum for arguments
based on non-Western concepts of sovereignty. 7
In fact, the ICJ gave Libya's Islamic arguments much less attention than
it gave Morocco's Islamic arguments in the Western Sahara dispute. Perhaps
this was due to the weaker Libyan claim to legitimate religious authority
through the Ottoman Caliph. More likely, however, the decreased attention
was due to the existence in the Aouzou strip dispute of an explicit boundary
agreement, made in accordance with Western principles of international
law. 7' The Court focused almost exclusively on the legitimacy and interpre-
tation of the 1955 boundary agreement between France and Libya, concluding
that the parties to the 1955 agreement intended to define their common
frontier by the treaty.'72 After interpreting the treaty, the ICJ delimited the
boundary in favor of Chad. 73
The existence of the 1955 treaty, however, was not the only reason that
the Court did not accept Libya's Islamic legal argument. In a separate opin-
ion, Judge Ajibola noted that even absent the 1955 treaty, Libya's Islamic
arguments would not have led to a decision in its favor.74 Judge Ajibola con-
cluded that the nature of state formation in Africa would not permit consider-
ation of religious ties.'75
169. See id. (comparing strength of Moroccan Sultan's religious authority and connection
to local authorities with Libya's similar ties).
170. See id. at 424-25 (noting possible impact of increased proportion ofjudges from non-
Western States).
171. See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 20 (Feb.
3) (discussing relevance of 1955 treaty to dispute). Even Libya agreed that the 1955 treaty
should be the "logical starting-point for consideration of the issues before the Court." Id. Libya
recognized the treaty's validity, but argued that at the time of the agreement "it lacked the
experience to engage in difficult negotiations with a Power enjoying the benefit of long
international experience." Id. On this basis, Libya suggested that the treaty should be construed
strictly in its favor. Id.
172. See id. at 28 (interpreting 1955 boundary agreement).
173. See id. at 37-40 (interpreting 1955 boundary agreement in favor of Chad).
174. See id. at 60 (separate opinion of Judge Ajibola) (discounting Libya's Islamic argu-
ments). Judge Ajibola reasoned that it would have been difficult "to find in favor of Libya on
the basis of the historic, religious, economic, geographic and security considerations it placed
before the Court." Id. (separate opinion of Judge Ajibola).
175. See id. (separate opinion of Judge Ajibola) ("It is no longer either possible or desir-
able to modify the frontiers of nations in the name of racial or religious criteria... if we were
to take as a criterion of our frontiers either race, tribe, or religion certain states in Africa would
be wiped off the map." (quoting President Tsirana, former Head of State of Madagascar)).
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The ICJ's reaction to the Islamic legal arguments in these two disputes
underscores the inapplicability of traditional Islamic legal arguments to
modem boundary and territorial disputes between Islamic states. The argu-
ments in both cases derived from an international system that disappeared
forever with the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate. 76 Still, there must be a way for
Islamic states to resolve such disputes using principles and arguments that are
substantively Islamic.'
1V New Islamic Legal Approaches to International Boundary Disputes
In examining the modem inapplicability of the Siyar, legal scholars
David Westbrook and Christopher Ford conclude that a new approach is
possible, albeit somewhat optimistic. 78 Ford suggests that Islamic law should
recognize that secular governments of Islamic nation-states do not succeed to
full Islamic legal sovereignty in the traditional sense.'7 9 This recognition
paves the way for the consideration of Islamic nation-states as "juridical 'indi-
viduals' under private Islamic law."'8 ° Ford acknowledges that the importa-
176. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (describing historical development of
Siyar); see also Ford, supra note 11, at 531 (discussing religious implications of Siyar's modem
inapplicability). Ford points out that the abandonment of the Siyar does not mean that an entire
body of divine law must be declared invalid. Id. Rather, the rules governing the unitary Islamic
State do not apply to the current international structure. Id. Ford states:
Could such large portions of the classical siyar simply have lapsed with the collapse
of the caliphate and the fragmentation of the dar al-Islam? There need be no question
of human alteration or even desuetude of God's Law, merely its inapplicability to the
question at hand. Rules specifically provided to govern the conduct of the unitary
Islamic theocracy have nothing to say about the conduct of secular territories.
Id
177. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of Apologists'
efforts to reconcile Siyar and modem international law).
178. See Ford, supra note 11, at 531-32 (discussing feasibility of new approaches to
Islamic international law); Westbrook supra note 15, at 884-86 (same).
179. See Ford, supra note 11, at 531 ("There is no doctrinal reason why the multitude of
secular rulers must each inherit the power-legitimating mantle of the Caliphate. Indeed, simple
logic might suggest that they cannot."). Ford is not the first scholar to propose this approach.
During the early twentieth century, a Muslim scholar named Abd al Razzaq al-Sanhuri sug-
gested the formation of an "irregular caliphate" compatible with the reality of an Islamic world
divided into distinct Islamic nation-states. See ABDAL-RAZZAQAL-SANHURI,LECALIFAT: SON
EVOLUTION VERS UNE SOCItE DES NATIONS ORIENTALES [THE CALIPHATE: ITS EVOLUTION IN
THE DIRECTION OF A SOCIETY OF ORmNTAL NATION-STATES] 570 (1926). Sanhuri stated:
Comme il est impossible, aujourd'hui, d'envisager le rdtablissement du Califat rdgu-
lier, un regime du califat irrdgulier s'impose et sejustifie part l'dtat de ndcessit6 oti le
monde musulman se trouve actuellement. [[A]s it is today impossible to imagine the
reestablishment of the traditional Caliphate, a system of irregular Caliphate is called
for and is justified by the state in which the Muslim world finds itself in fact].
Id.
180. Ford, supra note 11, at 531.
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tion of principles from private Islamic law to the international arena is an
ambitious and perhaps overly optimistic solution.' Yet no other solutions
exist that are both substantively Islamic and capable of offering real legal
principles useful in solving international disputes.
182
The approach outlined in the remainder of this Note takes a small first step
toward the solution Ford suggests by addressing the specific issue of inter-
national boundary disputes between Islamic states. First, Subpart A discusses
an Islamic doctrinal basis that could serve to permit the importation of princi-
ples from private Islamic law to the international arena. Subpart B then ex-
plains some basic principles from Islamic property law. Finally, Subpart C
describes several broad principles from this area of private Islamic law that
Islamic states could use in resolvingboundary disputes with otherIslamic states.
A. The Doctrinal Basis: Juristic Preference
Contrary to the popular conception that exists in the West,"3 Islamic law
is not a static and inflexible corpus containing specific rules of behavior and
181. See id. at 532 (noting barriers to implementation of this solution). Addressing the
limitations of his argument, Ford stated:
Such radical reformism would certainly be optimistic. An approach of this kind
would have to throw off an astonishing weight of historical baggage, even if it
merely needed to persuade the multahids [Muslim jurists] themselves. More
difficult still would be to persuade governments who, over the centuries, have
accrued dramatic benefits from the legitimacy afforded them by juristic docility.
Convincing ordinary Muslims would be the greatest challenge.
Id.
182. See Westbrook, supra note 15, at 821 (stating that any new approach to Islamic
international law must "address the concerns of public international law" and "locate legal
authority in Islam").
183. Unfortunately, the Western press reinforces already existing stereotypes regarding
Islamic law by mentioning Islamic law almost exclusively in the context of the hadd punish-
ments. These are the specific punishments mentioned in the Quran for crimes like murder,
adultery and theft. See THE QURAN 5:37 (specifying haddpunishment for theft). For example,
a brief survey of recent newspaper articles yielded dozens of articles regarding the hadd
punishment for theft in various Islamic countries. See, e.g., Gadhafi Facing Militant Islamic
Opposition; North Africa's Unrest may be Spreading into Secular Libya, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (describing attempts by Libyan
government to introduce hadd punishment for theft); Alistair Lyon, Taleban Bring Islamic
Hope and Force to Kabul, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Sept. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File (describing attempts by Taleban to introduce hadd punishments in
Afghanistan); Neil MacFarquhar, After War and Blockade, Crime Frays Life in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A3 (describing introduction of "traditional Islamic punishment" for
theft in Iraq); Pakistani to Have HandAmputatedfor Theft, AGENCE FRANCE PRESsE, Apr. 2,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (regarding punishments in United Arab
Emirates); Michael Richardson, Elections Pit Malaysia'sSecularRegimeAgainstlslamicParty
Religionists, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 24, 1995, at 4 (reporting on government attempts to
introduce hadd punishments in Malaysia); Thief's Fingers Chopped Off in Tehran, AGENCE
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punishment."' In fact, Islamic law is an extremely flexible and adaptable sys-
tem of interpretation. This flexibility exists despite the fact that Islamic law
stems from two immutable sources of law: the Quran and the Sunna.18 As
discussed in Part II, Islamic law relies on four sources. 86 The Quran and the
Sunna form the two immutable primary sources, whereas ima'a (societal con-
sensus)1'andqiyas(analogicalreasoning)providethetwosecondarysources."'
In addition to qiyas, some Sunni jurists..9 throughout history have en-
dorsed the doctrine of istihsan (juristic preference), 1 which legitimizes the
use ofra 'y (individual opinion) in solving disputes in accordance with Islamic
law. 91 Although istihsan is a flexible and pragmatic doctrine, it is not, as
FRANCE PRESE, Nov. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (describing
implementation of new "Islamic penal code" in Irn); Habib Trabelsi, Saudi Arabia Defends
Legal System Against Foreign Critics, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, July 27, 1995, available in
LEXIS News Library, Arcnws File (describing penal elements of Saudi legal system).
184. See Weiss, supra note 27, at 199-200 (discussing sources of Islamic law). Weissnotes
that, although Islamic law governs all interaction between God and Man and between Man and
Man, very few specific rules are actually spelled out. Id. Instead, man must derive the law from
the appropriate sources through interpretation. Id
185. See A.J. Wesnick, The Importance of Tradition for the Study oflslam, I 1 MOSLEM
WORLD 239,239 (1921) (describing the Sunna). The Sunna is the example of the Prophet as
evidenced by his collected sayings, or hadiths. Id.
186. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing sources of Islamic law).
187. See George F. Hourani, The Basis ofAuthority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam, 21
STUDIAISLAMICA 13,13 (1964) (defining Uma'a). Ijma'a is the unanimous opinion ofthe Sunni
community on a religious matter in a given generation. Id.
188. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 26, at 31 (defining Uma'a and qiyas as "dependent
sources"). According to Weeramantry, ijma'a and qiyas are "not sources stricto sensu but are
rather means for discovering the law." Id.
189. See id. at47-54 (describing fourmain schools of Sunni Islam). Throughoutthis subpart
of the Note there will be references to the various schools of Islamic law. Within Sunni Islam
there are four principal schools ofjurisprudence: the Maliki school (most prevalent inNorth and
West Africa); the Shaf'ai sch6ol (most prevalent in East Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia); the
Hanafi school (prevalent in Central Asia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon); and
the Hanbali school (prevalent throughout the Arabian peninsula). Id. at 49-54. The majority of
the world's Muslims adhere to Sunni Islam, andjurists of the four schools recognize and respect
the legitimacy of all four schools. Id at47-49. Within Shi'i Islam there are also various schools
ofjurisprudence, including the Ithna'Ashari (or Imami), the Zaydi, and the Ismaili schools. Id.
at 48. The primary distinction between Shi'i and Sunni Islam involves the Shi'i belief that the
descendants of the Prophet continued to provide divine inspiration and interpretation of Islam
after the death of the Prophet. Id. at 48. Although significant, the theological distinctions
between Sunni and Shi'i Islam do not play a major role in the issues discussed here.
190. See KASSIM, supra note 24, at 22 (describing istihsan generally). According to
Sarakshi, istihsan is "the abandonment of the opinion to which reasoning by the doctrine of
qiyas (systematic reasoning) would lead, in favor of a different opinion supported by stronger
evidence and adapted to what is accommodating to the people." Id.
191. See id at 14 (describing historical development of doctrine of istihsan within Maliki
school, primarily by Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf). Other similar doctrines supporting the use
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some scholars have maintained, reasoning based on equity."9 Rather, istihsan
is independent reasoning based on specific references to the two primary
sources of Islamic law, with consideration of the material facts and the best
interests of the Islamic community.19 Although it is controversial, 94 the
doctrine ofjuristic preference finds significant support in both the Quran and
the Sunna.'95
The concept of istihsan provides a pragmatic approach to solving the real
problems not addressed specifically in the Quran or the Sunna. 96 Despite its
of limited independent reasoning appeared in the other Sunni schools. Id. at 60. Malikijurists
adopted the doctrine of istislah (what is preferable). Hanbali scholars turned to the more limited
concept of istishab ("the presumption of continuity ofjudicial of legal situation as it had existed
previously, so long as there does not exist any evidence for its discontinuity"). Id.; see also
John Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 63, 67-68 (1985)
(discussing concept of istihsan).
192. See Makdisi, supra, note 191, at 67, 97 (stating that "istihsan has never been main-
tained by Islamic jurists as reasoning based on an equity independent of the Koran and the
Sunna"). Makdisi concludes thatthe doctrine is therefore close in meaning to "reasoned distinc-
tion of precedent" and rejects the interpretation of istihsan as reasoning by equity. Id. But see
DOI, supra note 3, at 82 (contending that "equitable considerations may override the results of
strict Qiyas taking into consideration the public interest"). These opposing views demonstrate
that the debate over the precise meaning of istihsan is not closed.
193. See KASSiM, supra note 24, at 22 (providing definition of istihsan).
194. See HOURANI, supra note 41, at 166-67 (discussing trend in Islamic jurisprudence).
By the eleventh century, orthodox jurists had successfully repressed the more radical forms of
Islamic legal interpretation. Id. at 166. It was not until the late nineteenth century that progres-
sive Muslim jurists began to re-examine the more flexible doctrines. Id. The most famous of
the modem proponents of independent reason in Islamic jurisprudence was the Egyptian,
Muhammad Abduh. Id. at 307. Writing at the turn of the century, Abduh advocated a return
"in the acquisition of religious knowledge, to its first sources, and to weigh them in the scale
of human reason." Id. at 308 (quoting Muhammad Abduh). Abduh advocated a return to
reasoned interpretation in order to allow jurists to "relate changing laws and customs to
unchanging principles, and by so doing to give them limits and a direction." Id.
195. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 26, at 31 (providing famous prophetic tradition in
support of istihsan). Weeramantry recounts:
[W]hen the Prophet appointed Muadh Ibn Jabal as a governor and judge in Yemen,
the Prophet asked him 'According to what will youjudge?' He replied, 'According
to the Book ofAllah.' 'And ifyoufindnoughttherein?' 'According to the Sunnah
of the Prophet.' 'And if you find nought therein?' 'Then I will exert myself to form
my own judgement.' The Prophet's response was, 'Praise be to Allah who has
guided the messenger of his Prophet to that which pleases His Prophet.'
Id; see also DOI supra note 3, at 81 (citing another Quraniic verse in support of istihsan:
"[tihose who listen to the word and follow the best meaning therein, they are they ones whom
Allah has guided, and they are the ones who posses understanding" (quoting THE QURAN
39:18)); KAssiM, supra note 24, at 23 (citing another famous prophetic tradition in support of
istihsan: "it is better that there is ease in your religion"); THE QuRAN 2:185 (providing that
"God intends every facility for you and not hardship").
196. See KASSiM, supra note 24, at 23 (describing key goals of istihsan as "convenience,
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continued controversy, many leading figures in the Islamic world have turned
to the doctrine ofjuristic preference as a possible answer to many of the prob-
lems facing Muslims in the modem world.197 From its inception, juristic pref-
erence had and continues to have particular significance in the realm of inter-
national relations."' The doctrine ofjuristic preference has significance even
in resolving disputes between two Islamic states within the Islamic world."'
The following Subpart of this Note examines basic Islamic doctrines of
property law. These doctrines have roots in the two primary sources of
Islamic law, the Quran and the Sunna. Under the pragmatic and flexible
doctrine of juristic preference, these principles could be transferred to the
arena of boundary disputes between Islamic states. Such a transfer could
provide for the reasoned resolution of international boundary disputes in the
Islamic world using principles grounded in the primary sources of Islamic law.
These transferred principles would thus fill the void left by the now largely
irrelevant Siyar after the disappearance of the traditional caliphate.
B. The Sources and Arguments
In Islamic law, all determinations of ownership of real property must
trace the land in question back to the point in time at which it came under
Islamic control. Determinations begin at that point by reference to a well-
developed system of categorization. The first important category in making
determinations of ownership concerns the quality of the land. In this category,
one asks if the land was fertile or barren at the time it came under Islamic
control.2" If the land was barren, certain legal consequences follow; this Note
facilitation and what is accommodating to the people").
197. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 26, at 43-44 (quoting speech given by King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia in July 1983). King Fahd supported a return to Islamic legal interpretation as a
solution to modem problems:
Today, my brothers, you see amultitude of new events and many unanswered ques-
tions and accumulated problems despite the abundance of theologians (ulema). The
problems are enormous and the responsibility we have before God is larger than any
one man's itihadofthe events of life unless that itihadis acceptable to ulema who
have thoroughly researched and examined old and new Islamic jurisprudence.
Id. at 43-44 (citing ASIAWEEK, July 1, 1983, at 13); see also KASSIM, supra note 24, at 102
(endorsing application of principles ofjuristic preference to modem problems facing Muslims).
198. See KAsSM, supra note 24, at28 (noting that doctrine ofjuristic preference is particu-
larly relevant to issue of international relations). Even Sarakshi, one of the earliest proponents
of the doctrine ofjuristic preference, recognized that the doctrine's greatest significance is in
the arena of international relations. Id.
199. See id. at 29 (quoting Sarakshi regarding relevance ofjuristic preference in disputes
involving two territories within territory of Islam).
200. See ABD AL-MUKHTAR YUNUs, AL-MULKIYYA FI AL-SHARIA AL-ISLAMIYYA WA
DAWRIHA FI AL-IQTIsAD AL-ISLAMI [OWNERSHIP UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND ITS ROLE IN THE
ISLAMIC ECONOMY] 221-23 (1987) (introducing system of categorization).
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discusses these later in this section. If the land was fertile, there is a second
important question: how the land initially came under Islamic control.2"'
Islamic jurists have identified three basic methods by which land can come
under Islamic control: (1) by conquest or subjugation, (2) by submission of
the inhabitants to Islam, and (3) by nonsubmissive treaty. 2 Each of these
three main categories contains further subcategories. This system ofcategori-
zation determines not only who owns the land, but what type of ownership is
involved: private, communal, or ownership by the Islamic State.20 3
This section outlines the basic system of categorization. It also examines
briefly the related but distinct Islamic legal principles regarding ownership of
natural resources. The following section then provides specific arguments
based on this system of categorization that could apply to current international
boundary disputes.
1. Fertile Land
a. By Conquest/Subjugation
When an Islamic army occupies land by military force after an armed
struggle or war, that land comes under control by conquest or subjugation.2 "'
Muslim jurists disagree, however, over the type of ownership of land indi-
cated by this category. Jurists of the Shafai, Zahiri, and some scholars of the
Hanbali and Maliki schools believe that land from conquest becomes the
private property of the Muslims who took part in the conquest.2"5 Under this
minority approach, the land is divided among the conquering Muslims as
spoils of war. To support this position, the minority cites several Quranic
verses.20 6 In addition, several Prophetic traditions (hadiths) offer more spe-
cific support for the spoils position.20 7
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 221 (explaining that ownership of real property under Islamic law is of three
types: private (mulkiyya khasa), community (mulkiyya 'ama) and ownership by Islamic state
(mulkiyya al-umma)).
204. See MUHAMMAD MAHDI AL-ASAFI, MULKIYYAT AL-'ARD W'AL THARWAT AL-
TABI9YYA FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI [LANDOWNERSHIP AND NATURAL RESOURCES IN ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE] 33 (1992) (defining conquest); YUNUS, supra note 200, at 225-38 (same).
205. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 35 (discussing this view); see also YUNUS, supra
note 200, at 248-49 (same).
206. See THE QURAN 8:41 ("Know that when you have taken from anything as spoils, one
fifth of it shall belong to God and his Prophet and his Prophet's family, the orphans, the desti-
tute and those who travel the road."); THE QuRAN 33:27 ("He made you masters of their land,
their houses, and their goods, and of yet another land on which you had never set foot before,
Truly God has power over all things."); see also YUNUS, supra note 200, at 228 (explaining that
jurists focus on phrase "from anything" (min shay'), holding that its breadth is meant to encom-
pass property of any sort).
207. See ABUDAUD, KITABAL-KHARAJW'AL-'AMARA 244-49 (reporting followinghadith
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The spoils position, however, is the minority view." 8 The majorityview,
to which the Imami Shi'i and most Maliki and Hanbali2 9 jurists subscribe,
holds that such land is communal property, owned by all Muslims and admin-
istered by the head of the Islamic community. In refuting the minority Shaftai
view, the majority points out that several Quranic verses distinguish between
real property and other property. The majority argues that spoils include.
livestock, personal property, money, and weapons (but not real property).
210
In support of its position, the majority cites a selected passage from the Quran:
As for those spoils of theirs which God has assigned to His apostle, you
spurred neither horse nor camel to capture them: but God gives his apos-
tles authority over whom he will. God has power over all things. The
spoils taken from the town-dwellers and assigned by God to His apostle
shall belong to God, to the Apostle and his kinsfolk, to the orphans, to the
destitute and to the traveler in need; they shall not become the property of
the rich among you. Whatever the Apostle gives you, accept it; and what-
ever he forbids you, forbear from it. Have fear of God; God is stem in
retribution.21
The majority contends that this verse shows that God is responsible for
all conquests. If God is responsible for all conquests, it is inappropriate to
related by Abu Harira). The hadith is as follows: "Any village that God and his Prophet
subjugate will belong to God and his Prophet. Any village that the Muslims subjugate by force
will belong in one fifth share to God and his Prophet and the remainder will belong to those
who took part in the conquest." Id.; see also SAHIHMUSLIM, KITABAL-JIHADw'AL SIYR 1374-
76 (reporting another applicable hadith). Another hadith states: "Any village that you carry
away and occupy and in which you participate, any such village that resists God and his
Prophet, one fifth of it will belong to God and his Prophet and the rest belongs to you." Id.
208. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 249 (notingthatanotherminority position exists within
Hanafi school). Some Hanafi jurists believe that land acquired by conquest or subjugation
remains the private property of the original owners as long as they continue to pay the property
tax assessed by the Islamic state. Id. However, they also hold that such land reverts to the
Islamic State if the owner dies without an acceptable heir under Islamic law. Id. at 251.
209. But see AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 48 (distinguishing Hanbali position). Hanbali
jurists hold that the Imam may choose between dividing such land as spoils or declaring it to
be communal property belonging to all Muslims. Id
210. See id. at 38 (addressing Quranic verse used by minority). The minority cites Chapter
33, Verse 27: "He made you masters of their land their houses, and their goods, and of yet
another land on which you had never set foot before, Truly God has power over all things." Id.
The majority points out that the phrase "he made you masters of.. ." (awrithakum) does not
mean private ownership because the same word is used with reference to the Quran where it
certainly does not mean private ownership. Id. The majority also refutes the minority's
interpretation of the hadith that reads: "Any village that you carry away and occupy and in
which you participate, any such village that resists God and his Prophet, one fifth of it will
belong to God and his Prophet and the rest belongs to you." Id. at 39. The majority interprets
the final phrase "to you" (talum) to mean "to all Muslims" as communal property and not to the
muharibun as spoils. ME
211. THE QuRAN 58:6-8.
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divide conquered land as spoils to reward those who have taken part.2 1 2 To do
so would suggest that Man and not God is responsible for the conquest. Also,
the majority interprets the references to orphans and the destitute as evidence
that God intended any land conquered in the name of Islam to be the property
of all Muslims.213
The majority view - that such land is the communal property of all Mus-
lims - is somewhat misleading. Jurists also hold that individual Muslims may
gain limited property rights in land assigned to this category.214 Individuals
can acquire such rights by receiving a grant from the leader of the Islamic
community or simply by occupying and using the land for any useful pur-
pose.2"5 A Muslim holding these limited property rights may not sell the land
itself, but he may transfer the same usufruct rights by sale, gift, or devise.216
The property rights continue as long as the individual owner continues to use
the land for some beneficial purpose.217
Within this subcategory of fertile land gained through conquest, a further
distinction exists between actively cultivated fertile land and naturally fertile
land. Examples of naturally fertile land include pastures and forests.2"8
According to most jurists, the majority rule discussed above applies to both
actively cultivated and naturally fertile land.219 The Imami Shi'ijurists, how-
ever, believe that the Islamic State, not the Muslim community in general,
owns the naturally fertile land.'
b. By Submission to the Call of Islam
Land that comes under Islamic control by the submission of the inhabit-
ants to the call of Islam, without armed struggle or resistance, is considered
the private property of the original inhabitants." Numerous examples of this
212. See YuNuS, supra note 200, at231-33 (describing majority's interpretation ofverse).
213. See id. (discussing usufruct rights on communal property).
214. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 100-05 (discussing acquisition and transfer of
usufruct rights on communal property).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 106-07.
217. Id. at 106.
218. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 239 (providing examples of naturally fertile land).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 250 (providing argument in support of this view). The argument is that
naturally fertile land has no owner before it comes under Islamic control. Id Under Shi'i
doctrine, all unowned land is the property of the Islamic state. Id. (citing MUHAMMAD BAQIR
AL-SADR, IQTIsADUNA 321).
221. See ABuYusuF, AL-KHARAJ 58-59 (providing following prophetic tradition: "Iasked
the leader of the faithful what the law was regarding those non-Muslims who submitted them-
selves and their lands, and he replied: truly, they are protected, and whatever wealth they submit
shall be theirs and also their land shall be theirs"); see also YUNUS, supra note 200, at 240-42
(same).
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type of property exist throughout the history of Islamic expansion, such as the
cultivated areas of Yemen and Bahrain in the early period of Islamic expan-
sion on the Arabian peninsula.'m Indonesia provides a later example that is
further removed from the birthplace of Islam.' All of the jurists of the vari-
ous schools agree that land in this category becomes the private property of
the original inhabitants. 4
c. By Nonsubmissive Treaty
The category of land coming under Islamic control by nonsubmissive
treaty includes land held by non-Muslims in the face of unsuccessful attempts
at subjugation and conquest.' In such cases, the terms of the specific treaty
determine the ownership of the land. Muslims must respect the terms of the
treaty and may take no more property rights in the land than those granted by
thetreaty. 6 This is the majority position among virtually all Muslimjurists." 7
If the treaty so provides, the non-Muslims have full rights to sell, give, or
devise the land that they owned before it came under Islamic control. 8
Moreover, most jurists hold that non-Muslims in such cases may sell and
devise their land according to their own religious laws. 9
Some disagreement persists among the jurists, however, concerning
property taxes assessed against non-Muslim landowners. Two questions
cause the disagreement: First, must the owner continue to pay the tax if he
converts to Islam? Second, if the non-Muslim owner sells the land to a
222. YuNus, supra note 200, at 240 (providing examples).
223. IL
224. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 267 (discussing this unanimous position); YuNus,
supra note 200, at 248 (same).
225. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 241 (defining category).
226. See ABUABID, AL-AMWAL 211 (providing following hadith in support of this view:
"If you make war against a people and they give up their wealth to your protection but without
submitting themselves or their sons, and they negotiate a peace with you, then take nothing from
them more than that, for verily more than that is not permitted you"); see also YuNuS, supra
note 200, at 241-42 (explaining that such treaties could be of two general types). First, the
treaty could provide that the non-Muslims would retain only a possessory interest in the land
they owned before it came under Islamic control, with actual title belonging to all Muslims as
communal property. Id. Such a possessory interest would remain as long as the possessor or
his descendants remained on the land, but neither the possessor nor any other individual -
Muslim or non-Muslim - could purchase the land as private property. Id. The second type of
treaty would provide that the land would remain the private property of the non-Muslims who
held it before it came under Islamic control. Id. In this case, the non-Muslim owners would
have full title to the land, subject only to the tax assessed by the Imam. Id.
227. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 254 (discussing majority view); YUNuS, supra note
200, at 249 (same).
228. See YuNUS, supra note 200, at 242 (describing extent of rights under such treaties).
229. AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 255.
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Muslim, what happens to the property tax?"3 The majority view maintains
that the tax ceases if the non-Muslim owner converts to Islam or if he sells the
land to a Muslim buyer."
2. Barren Land
The majority view holds that barren land initially belongs to no one.32
Therefore, most scholars maintain that considerations of how barren land
came under Islamic control are largely irrelevant in determining ownership. 33
Under Islamic law, the support for this view derives from the absence of any
explicit prohibition against taking barren land for private ownership."
However, most schools of thought also hold that a Muslim can obtain
private ownership of land by revitalizing and cultivating it.35 Considerable
and specific support for this position lies largely in the form of prophetic
traditions.36 This interpretation also finds strong support in the commentary
of prominent Muslim jurists from several different schools."
230. See id. at 256-58 (discussing these two dilemmas).
231. See id. at 257 (describing majority position as set out by lbn QudamaAl-Mukadisi and
Ibn al-Qayim al-Jawziyya, two famous Hanbalijurists). Most Maliki scholars believe, however,
that under certain circumstances the tax may pass to the non-Muslim seller personally if he sells
the land to a Muslim buyer. Id. at 260. Most Imami jurists also believe that if a non-Muslim
sells land to a Muslim buyer, the tax passes from the land to the seller personally. Id. at 261.
232. See id. at 139 (describing this basic assumption); YuNUS, supra note 200, at 243
(same).
233. See YuNus, supra note 200, at 243 (discussing majority view). But see AL-ASAFI,
supra note 204, at 143 (noting minority view). According to a small minority of early scholars,
there is an exception for barren land taken by force, which is considered the communal property
of all Muslims. Id.
234. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 139 (discussing underlying support for majority
position). But see id. at 134 (noting minority Shi'i view that all unowned property belongs to
Islamic State). The support for this minority position comes from several Prophetic traditions
which mention that "all the wasteland" and the "dry river valleys" belong to "God's Prophet,
and to the Imam after him, to do with as he pleases." Id.
235. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 244 (expounding on majority opinion). But see AL-
AsAFI, supra note 204, at 147-53 (explaining minority Imami view also held by small number
of Hanafi scholars that barren land of any sort belongs to Islamic state). However, even this
minority view allows individual Muslims to obtain usufruct rights by means of revitalization
or cultivation. Id. at 147. This possessory interest is exclusive and includes full rights to use
and profit from the land. Id. at 144. The right continues as long as the possessor maintains the
land's fertility, although title remains permanently with the Islamic State. Id.
236. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 145 (providing numerous traditions in support of
this view). Four of the most frequently cited hadiths are as follows: (1) "Whoever revitalizes
barren land, the land shall belong to him;" (2) "Return the land to God and His Prophet and it
shall be yours;" (3) "Whatever tribe revitalizes some land and makes it fertile, they will have a
right to it, and it will be theirs;" and (4) "Whoever cultivates land that belongs to no one, then
that will belong to him." Id.
237. See id. (stating that "the general opinion of the jurists of all the major cities is that
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This interpretation raises the question of what happens to barren land that
is acquired through revitalization and then allowed to revert to its barren state
by the initial owner. If a subsequent possessor revitalizes the land, can he
then acquire ownership? The majority says that he cannot. 8 Their rejection
of such a transfer of ownership reflects Islamic law's historic unwillingness
to accept the notion of adverse possession."' Once initial ownership by
revitalization has been established, it can end only by sale, grant, or devise.240
Still, a minority holds that ownership depends upon the owner's continued
cultivation or beneficial use and maintenance of the land. 4'
3. Natural Resources
The law governing ownership of natural resources is related to the
categories discussed above. It is, however, a distinct area of Islamic law and
merits some individual attention. Determinations of ownership of natural
resources depend to some degree on the type of ownership of the land in
which the resources are located and on the type of resources involved.242
a. Mineral Resources
Almost all jurists agree that mineral resources located on State property
belong to the Islamic State.243 More specifically, the head of the Islamic State
should exploit and administer the mineral resources for the benefit of all
Muslims.2" Jurists disagree, however, on the issue of ownership of mineral
resources located on land not owned by the Islamic State.4
Maliki jurists maintain the majority view that all mineral resources
on communal or private property are the communal property of all Mus-
ownership of barren land comes through revitalization" (citing TATHKIRAT AL-FUQAHA 400)).
238. See id. at 154-55 (explaining this majority view held by jurists of Shafai school as
well as some jurists of the Maliki and Hanafi schools).
239. See S.H. AMiN, WRONGFUL APPROPRIATiON IN ISLAMc LAW 3 (1983) (discussing
respect for property in Islamic law). Amin notes that:
Respect for property in Islam is so unconditional that the concept of negative pre-
scription and limitation has never been received in Islamic law at all. Indeed when
this concept was for the first time introduced to Iranian law in the Civil Procedure
Code, the Islamic jurists branded the concept as un-Islamic and strongly opposed it.
Id.
240. See AL-AsAFI, supra note 204, at 155 (quoting famous jurist al-Kasani).
241. See id. (explaining minority view held by some Maliki and Hanafi jurists).
242. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 253 (describing categorization in law of natural
resources).
243. See id at 253 (supporting majority opinion).
244. See id. (detailing role of head of Islamic State).
245. See id. at 254 (noting widespread disagreement among jurists on this issue).
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lims.246 According to the Maliki view, the head of the Islamic State should
administer and exploit these resources in the best interests of the Islamic
community. The majority view relies in part on the Quranic verses:
Heisthe Onewho createdforyou everythingthatthe earth contains, evenuptothe
sky, and He fashioned it into seven heavens. He has knowledge of all things. 7
The majority view also relies on Man's absolute need for mineral re-
sources.248 Man cannot do without these resources, so their equitable distribu-
tion is extremely important. The ruler (hakim) has the power (sulta) to distrib-
ute and exploit the resources according to the needs of the Islamic commu-
nity.249 Therefore, the head of the Islamic community must bear the responsi-
bility of exploiting and distributing mineral resources.' °
Somejurists have created a further distinction between mineral resources
that are easy to extract and exploit and those that are difficult to extract and
exploit."1 The general principle holds that an individual can obtain ownership
of minerals that are difficult to exploit, but not of easily exploited mineral
resources. 2 Al-Asafi gives oil, coal, and salt as examples of easily exploited
resources. 3 Iron, gold, and silver are examples of mineral resources that are
difficult to extract and exploit. 4 This distinction appears to rely rather
heavily on policy rather than religious grounds. There is no need to encourage
people to exploit resources that are easy to extract2 5" The possibility of
246. See id. (discussing Maliki view). Yunus notes that a minority Maliki view holds that
minerals on private land are the private property of the owner. Id. at 255.
247. THE QURAN 2:29; see also YUNUS,supra note 200, at 255 (discussing Quranic verse).
The majority interpretation holds that the phrase "for you" (lakum) means for all Muslims com-
munally. Id. The phrase "everything that the earth contains" (mafr al-ardjamciyyan) refers
inter alia to mineral resources. Id..
248. See YuNus, supra note 200, at 255 (explaining Man's need for mineral resources).
249. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 303 (detailing responsibilities of head of Islamic
State regarding distribution and exploitation of mineral resources).
250. See id. at 299-303 (supporting this conclusion); YUNUS, supra note 200, at 255
(same).
251. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 319 (discussing distinction in detail). The actual
terms for this distinction are zahira, which means "apparent" or "obvious," and batina, which
means "concealed" or "internal." Id. at 319-20. However, jurists use them in this context to
refer to the amount of human labor necessary to extract or exploit the resources. Id. at 319-20;
see also YuNUs, supra note 200, at 255 (discussing further distinctions). Some Hanbali and
Zaidijurists make a further distinction between solid and nonsolid minerals. Id. They maintain
that tar, petroleum, water, and other nonsolid resources cannot be private property-they belong
to everyone. Id. According to these same jurists, however, solid minerals (hard metals, for
example) belong to the owner of the land on which they are located. Id.
252. See AL-AsAFI, supra note 204, at 319-21 (discussing this distinction).
253. Id. at319.
254. Id. at 319-20.
255. Id.
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ownership, however, creates a useful incentive to encourage the extraction of
more inaccessible mineral resources. 6
b. Water Resources
Given the birthplace of Islam, it is not surprising that Islamic law con-
tains many specific rules regarding the ownership of water and water rights.
These rules depend on an even more elaborate system of classification. Jurists
specify various rules with respect to underground water, lakes, rivers, well
water, water extracted from underground sources on private property, and
water on barren land. 2" However, the general principle is the same: water is
the communal property of all Muslims." This principle relies on a very well-
known prophetic tradition: "Man shares in three things: water, fire, and pas-
ture."29 The more specific rules regarding possessory and usufruct rights to
various water resources are interesting and could certainly have a bearing on
some international boundary disputes. However, they are also extremely
complicated and a full discussion of the specific rules is beyond the scope of
this Note.
260
c. Naturally Occurring Pasture
Naturally occurring pasture (al-kila') refers to vegetation that does not
depend on active human cultivation or irrigation and is sufficient to support
grazing. 6' Pasture that depends on active human cultivation or irrigation is
the property of the owner of the land itself.62 The vast majority of jurists
hold that naturally occurring pasture is the communal property of all Mus-
lims.263 This rule applies whether the pasture is on State land, communal land,
256. Id This distinction may not be particularly useful today because the categorization
of minerals as difficult or easy to extract is ambiguous and subject to change. For example, Al-'
Asafi first lists oil as an example of a mineral resource that is easy to exploit. Id at 319.
However, he later admits that in today's world this example is no longer true. Id. at 321. Oil
exploitation now imposes significant costs in both the extraction and refining processes and so
it has become a mineral resource that is difficult to exploit. Id
257. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 261-63 (discussing various categories and rules).
258. See id. at 261 (supporting general principle).
259. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 292 (discussing famous prophetic tradition); see
also YUNUS, supra note 200, at 256 (same). A further interpretation of this hadith emphasizes
the fact that the three resources mentioned "are not part of the land, and one does not own them
with the land." Id.
260. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 329-40 (providing discussion of rules governing
ownership of water); YuNus, supra note 200, at 261-63 (same).
261. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 264 (defining term "naturally occurring pasture").
262. Id
263. See id. (describing majority position).
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or private property.2 4 The support for this position stems from the same
prophetic tradition that supports communal ownership of other natural re-
sources: "Man shares in three things: water, fire, and pasture.1
265
This position presents a problem because communal use of naturally
occurring pasture entails a severe infringement on the rights of the land's
owner, especially in the case of privately owned land. Somejurists avoid this
problem by holding that the owner of land on which there is naturally occurring
pasture may fence the land off.2' However, if someone requests the use of the
pasture, the owner must cut the vegetation and bring it to that person as an
alternative to allowing the person to come onto the land to use it.267 Some
Maliki scholars hold that naturally occurring pasture on privately owned land
that is fenced in or otherwise clearly marked belongs to the owner of the land.268
C. Principles for Application to International Boundary Disputes
The Islamic law of property yields several broad principles that Islamic
states could use in resolving international boundary disputes with other
Islamic states. The final sections of this Note outline three of these principles
and examine the ways in which each principle might apply to the facts of the
Western Sahara dispute. The first broad concept is the doctrine of ownership
through beneficial use.269 The second is the concept of State stewardship of
communal land and natural resources.270 The third concept is absolute respect
for the terms of agreements by which property is transferred.27
1. Beneficial Use
The previous subpart described the principle that individuals can acquire
ownership of barren land by revitalizing it, cultivating it, or making some
other beneficial use of it.272 An Islamic nation-state could use this principle
264. Id.
265. See AL-ASAFI, supra note 204, at 292 (discussing famous prophetic tradition); see
also YUNUS, supra note 200, at 256 (same). A further interpretation of this hadith emphasizes
the fact that the three resources mentioned "are not part of the land, and one does not own them
with the land." Id. at 256. There is extensive debate surrounding the meaning of the term "fire"
(al-nar) in the hadith. Id. at 264-65. Some jurists hold that it refers literally to fire itself. Id
Others hold that it refers to the means of fire including dead wood and even live trees. Id
266. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 264 (providing various interpretations of general rule).
267. Id
268. See id. (discussing Maliki view).
269. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text (outlining beneficial use doctrine).
270. See supra notes 209-17, 246-50 and accompanying text (discussing ownership of
communal land and mineral resources).
271. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (describing obligations of Muslims
under treaties).
272. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text (providing basis for this principle).
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in a two-pronged argument in support of a sovereignty claim. First, the state
would have to show that the territory in question was barren at the time it
came under Islamic control. Barren land for the purposes of this argument is
land that is agriculturally barren and sterile.' 7 Land that is agriculturally
barren but that contains valuable natural resources still is considered barren
land because natural resources are not part of the land for the purpose of
determining ownership. 4
Second, the State would have to show that it entered the land while it was
barren and put it to some beneficial use. Again, beneficial use for the purpose
of determining ownership probably is limited to beneficial agricultural use.
It would not show beneficial use for the government to extract and exploit
natural resources in the disputed territory. It is possible that a State could
satisfy this requirement by providing agricultural subsidies, funding agricul-
tural development by local people in the region, funding agricultural develop-
ment by its own nationals in the region, or by directly cultivating land through
government-owned model or experimental farms.
One issue that could arise with respect to this argument is a change in
sovereignty. If one state (or nationals ofthat state) puts the disputed territory
to beneficial use and later abandons it and a second state then occupies the
territory and puts it to beneficial use, which state has the stronger claim? The
majority opinion holds that the original party retains title despite subsequent
abandonment of the land.275 Still, there is a substantial minority position
holding that ownership depends upon the owner's continued cultivation or
beneficial use and maintenance of the land.276 A given Islamic state's ability
legitimately to argue one of these two positions may depend on the dominant
school ofjurisprudence in the region.
2. State Stewardship of Communal Property
A second argument that could prove useful in international boundary dis-
putes involves the concept of communal ownership of certain land and natural
resources. A majority view holds that all fertile land that comes under Islamic
control through conquest or armed subjugation is communal property owned
by all Muslims and administered by the head of the Islamic community.277
This rule applies both to naturally fertile land and to land that is fertile due to
active cultivation or irrigation by non-Muslims at the point of subjugation.278
273. See YUNUS, supra note 200, at 243 (defining barren land for property law purposes).
274. Cf supra notes 246-68 and accompanying text (illustrating this distinction).
275. See AL-ASAFI,supra note 204, at 154-55 (explaining this majority view held byjurists
of Shaf'ai school as well as some jurists of Maliki and Hanafi schools).
276. See id. at 155 (explaining minority view held by some Maliki and Hanafi jurists).
277. See supra notes 209-17 and accompanying text (analyzing property rights in land
acquired by conquest or subjugation).
278. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (noting majority view of ownership of
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 529 (1998)
As discussed above, the majority view also holds that most natural
resources - most importantly, mineral resources - are communal property.279
As with communally owned land, the ruler of the Islamic State is responsible
for the administration and exploitation of the resources for the benefit of the
Islamic community."' In the traditional Islamic system, the Caliph bore this
responsibility. However, in the world of nation-states, a different interpreta-
tion is necessary.
An Islamic state seeking to use this principle before the ICJ or in arbitra-
tion could make two related arguments. First, the state should point to its
cultural, historical, and religious ties of allegiance to any Muslims living in
the disputed territory. The state with the closest ties to the local Muslims
would seem to be in the best position to administer the resources of that
territory on their behalf and for their benefit. Second, the state should point
to its technological and infrastructural ability efficiently to exploit and admin-
ister the resources. The state most able efficiently to exploit and extract the
resource should have control of the land and administer it on behalf of those
people living on it or near it.
The unitary Caliphate is gone, and a system of nation-states has replaced
it.2"' In the modem system, Islamic nation-states must administer these com-
munal resources on behalf of the entire Islamic community. This solution
fulfills the purpose behind the Islamic law of natural resources. By providing
efficient and religiously legitimate stewardship of communal property, the
nation-state will work for the benefit of the entire Islamic community.
3. Respect for Territorial and Boundary Agreements
Many scholars have addressed the issue of Islamic concepts ofpactasunt
servanda in Islamic law, even in traditional Islamic international law.2" 2
However, the general concept in Islamic law lacks the breadth of its Western
counterpart.2"3 The Islamic law of property provides a much stronger state-
ment of the principle pacta sunt servanda with specific reference to agree-
ments concerning the transfer of territory.
cultivated and fertile land).
279. See supra notes 246-68 and accompanying text (describing communal property view
of natural resources).
280. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (describing ruler's responsibility to
use resources for good of Islamic community).
281. Cf SANHURI, supra note 179, at 569 (discussing replacement of traditional Caliphate
with irregular Caliphate compatible with system of nation-states).
282. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing Ford's analysis of Islamic
version of pacta sunt servanda).
283. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing Islamic version ofpacta
sunt servanda).
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In Islamic property law, the principle appears in absolute terms. In inter-
preting property rights transferred by agreement, the terms of the agreement
determine the rights of the parties absolutely.2 ' Muslims must respect the
terms of the treaty and may take no more property rights in the land than those
granted by the treaty.285 This is the majority position among virtually all
Muslim jurists.286
This principle suggests that when a boundary agreement that is valid
under international law exists between the parties, its terms will determine the
territorial rights of the parties. This concept may seem somewhat self-evident.
However, Libya's arguments against the terms of the 1955 boundary agree-
ment suggest that the concept needs reinforcement." 7
D. Application to the Facts of the Western Sahara Case
Applying these principles to any specific territorial dispute requires two
preliminary steps. First, it requires a determination of whether the land in
dispute was fertile or barren at the time it came under Islamic control and
thereafter. Second, if the land was fertile at the time it came under Islamic
control, one must examine how it came under Islamic control.
1. Classification
Classification of the land encompassing the territory of Western Sahara
is a fairly straightforward task. A French visitor to the area in the seventeenth
century described it as a desolate desert "[i]nhabited only by Wild Beasts.o
288
Little has changed since the seventeenth century to question the veracity of
that description.289 For the most part, the territory is a sandless desert.2" The
land consists of dry, rocky plains rising gradually to the coast.2" Near the
coast, the territory is characterized by dry, alluvial plains and in the interior
by "sterile rocky plateaus. 2 ' The coastal regions receive two to eight inches
284. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (describing laws governing non-
submissive treaties).
285. See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text (discussing laws governing non-
submissive treaties).
286. See AL-AsAFI, supra note 204, at 254 (discussing majority position); YuNUs, supra
note 200, at 249 (same).
287. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing Libya's arguments in
dispute with Chad).
288. See DAUMs, supra note 101, at 1-2 (quoting SIEUR LE MAIRE, VOYAGES AUX ISLES
CANAREs, CAP-VERD, SENEGAL (1695)).
289. See id. at I (noting that region "has never been an inviting area').
290. Id. at 2.
291. l
292. Id at 3.
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of rainfall per year, while the interior receives almost none."
Generally, the entire region is totally unsuited for agriculture.294 The
Sakiet al-Hamra is the only river in the region, and it only provides irrigation
sufficient for year-round cultivation of date trees along its banks.295 The
region also exhibits a strong cultural barrier to agriculture. For centuries,
local tribes delegated any agricultural tasks to slaves from sub-Saharan Africa.
The local Sahrawis associate agriculture with slavery and remain extremely
disdainful of it.296 As a result of this cultural legacy, the Western Sahara has
seen none of the private land ownership disputes "that plagued many other
Third World countries."
297
The slopes and depressions "that punctuate the rocky plains are relatively
fertile" and nurture some wild vegetation including acacia, jujube, gum trees,
scattered scrub brush, thorn trees, esparto grass, clover, and small flowers.29
In the southern region, there is enough of this naturally occurring vegetation
to support some game animals including hare, gazelle, antelope, and os-
triches.299 The naturally occurring pasture also supports considerable migrant
grazing.
3
00
293. Id.
294. See VIRGINIA THOMPSON & RICHARD ADLOFF, THE WESTERN SAHARANS: BACK-
GROUND TO CONFLICT 123 (1980) (discussing geography of Western Sahara). Theauthorsnote
that "[i]n the Spanish Sahara, agriculture lacks everything it needs in sufficient quantity for its
development except sunshine." Id. Barriers to agriculture include: poor and scanty soil;
limited and highly saline water; wind and sand storms; locusts; droughts; extremely high
temperatures; and an unwilling and unskilled workforce. Id
295. DAMS, supra note 101, at 3; see also THOMPSON&ADLOFF,supra note 294, at 123
(noting that Sakiet al-Hamra is main water source in area).
296. See JOHN MERCER, SPANISH SAHARA 167 (1976) (describing cultural barrier to
agriculture among nomads in region); THOMPSON&ADLOFFsupra note 294, at 123-24 (stating
that only descendants of former slaves (called herratin) fanned land).
297. THOMPSoN & ADLOFF, supra note 294, at 124; see also Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J.
12, 41 (Oct. 16) (discussing landownership in region). The ICJ noted that "the right of pasture
was enjoyed in common" but that "some areas suitable for cultivation, on the other hand, were
subject to a greater degree to separate rights." Id.
298. DAMS, supra note 101, at 3; see also MERCER, supra note 296, at 39 (describing
local vegetation); THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 294, at 123 (same). These bowl-like
depressions are calledgrara and are generally no more than 300 meters in diameter. MERCER,
supra note 296, at 39.
299. See DAMNS, supra note 101, at 3 (describing local wildlife). But see MERCER, supra
note 296, at 39-40, 46-47 (noting that Spanish and nomads had hunted game animals to near
extinction by 1970s).
300. See DAMS,supra note 101, at 3 (discussing animal husbandry and migratory grazing).
In 1973, for example, the land supported 76,000 camels and 120,000 goats. Id; see also
MERCER, supra note 296, at 165 (providing slightly different but roughly comparable figures
for domesticated animal population from 1952-1971); THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 294,
at 124 (discussing animal husbandry in area).
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This description accounts for both the current condition of the land and
the condition at the time it came under Islamic control."° Spanish and later
Moroccan intervention did little to change the nature of the land. 2 Agricul-
ture simply is not viable in the conditions of the Western Sahara. The local
people from the time of Spanish occupation through the present have had to
import food for their survival.3 The local economy relies on animal hus-
bandry, crafts, coastal fishing, and mining."° Western Sahara was, and
remains, one of the most barren regions in Africa. Given this classification,
the second question - how Western Sahara came under Islamic control - is
irrelevant.
05
2. Beneficial Use Applied
The classification of the land as barren at the time it came under Islamic
control leads to the conclusion that it is unowned.3" Anyone could have
established ownership over the land by revitalizing it or cultivating it. 7 If,
for example, Morocco had launched a significant program supporting and
funding irrigation and cultivation of large parts of the region, such actions
might have established ownership through the doctrine of beneficial use.
However, Morocco launched no such programs. Indeed, given the severity of
the conditions, it is possible that no amount of money or water could change
the barren status of Western Sahara.
308
301. See MERCER, supra note 296, at 10 (discussing conditions in region).
302. See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 294, at 123-24 (discussing agriculture in the
region). The Spanish made several relatively unsuccessful attempts at setting up experimental
model farms between 1950 and 1975. IdL; see MERCER, supra note 296, at 270-71 (discussing
Spanish experimental farms). These farms encountered the same problems agriculture had
always faced in the region - saline water, poor soil and an ambivalent source of labor. Id.
303. See THOMPSON & ADLOFF, supra note 294, at 123 (discussing food imports).
Thompson and Adloff note that even in the best years for local agriculture the inhabitants must
import large amounts of food. Ida
304. See id. at 122-26 (discussing local economy of Western Sahara).
305. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (noting that Islamic law does not consider
how barren land came under Islamic control when determining ownership). Arabs led the
Islamic expansion into Morocco in 680 A.D. MERCER,supra note 296, at 71. ThelocalBerber
people, having converted, then spread Islam south into the Sahara in the course oftrans-Saharan
trade with the people of the Upper Niger and Senegal. See id. at 71-72 (describing spread of
Islam in region).
306. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text (discussing classification of barren
land).
307. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (describing requirements for obtaining
ownership of barren land).
308. See TONY HODGES, WESTERN SAHARA: THE ROOTs OF A DESERT WAR 122 (1983)
(quoting Admiral Carrero Blano, vice-president of Spanish government in 1966). Admiral
Blanco remarked of the region: "We will never extract the slightest material benefit here." Id.
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Given the sterility of the land, there must have been some reason that
Morocco, Spain, and Mauritania all showed such interest in the region. 'One
possible explanation lies in Western Sahara's mineral resources. These
natural resources also provide a possible argument for Morocco's sovereignty
claim on the basis of state stewardship of communal property.
3. State Stewardship of Communal Property Applied
In 1961, Spanish geologists discovered one of the world's largest depos-
its of phosphate rock at Bu Craa near E1-Ayoun in Western Sahara."° In
1975, the Spanish extracted 5.6 million tons of phosphate from the Bu Craa
vein. 10 Under Islamic law governing natural resources, these minerals are
communal property."' The leader of the Islamic community bears the respon-
sibility of exploiting them in the best interests of all Muslims."2
In the modem world of nation-states, this means that the leader of the
Islamic nation-state best able to manage the resources for the benefit of the
local Muslims should have control over exploitation of the minerals. To make
this argument, Morocco would have to show two things. First, it would have
to argue that by reason of its close historical, cultural, and religious ties to the
people of Western Sahara, Morocco occupies the best and most legitimate
position to administer the resources on the behalf of the inhabitants and for
the good of the entire Islamic community. These arguments would resemble
closely the arguments Morocco put before the ICJ in support of its legal ties
to the territory.1 3
Second, Morocco would need to argue that it is best equipped technologi-
cally to exploit the resources on behalf of the local Muslims and the Islamic
community. Within its own internationally recognized borders, Morocco
holds the largest phosphate reserves in the world.314 Estimated at 16.2 billion
tons, Morocco's reserves constitute approximately half of total world
reserves.315 Morocco's Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP) has mined
(quoting LE MONDE, Jan. 22, 1980).
309. DAMIS, supra note 101, at4.
310. Id. There is some evidence of other minerals in the region including iron, titanium,
vanadium, zinc, uranium, potassium, copper, gold, natural gas, magnetite and petroleum. Id
However, these other minerals remain unexploited if they in fact exist. Id.
311. See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text (discussing stewardship of mineral
resources).
312. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text (noting head of Islamic State's
authority to control mineral resources).
313. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text (discussing Morocco's arguments in
Western Sahara dispute).
314. DAMIS, supra note 101, at25.
315. Id.
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phosphates since 1921, and it has operated as a state-owned monopoly since
Moroccan iridependence in 1956.316 In 1981, the OCP produced 19.7 million
tons of phosphates. 17 Moreover, Morocco was able to export 15.6 million
tons of this total due to low domestic demand." The OCP plans eventually
to expand production of Western Sahara's Bu Craa phosphate mine to some-
where between five and ten million tons per year.319
Given its position as a major world producer and exporter of phosphates,
Morocco stands in an excellent position to revitalize Western Sahara's own
phosphate industry - which virtually collapsed after Spanish decoloniza-
tion320 - through the OCP. As an Islamic state with close religious and
cultural ties to the Muslims in Western Sahara, Morocco is also the most
legitimate Islamic authority to oversee the exploitation and distribution of this
communally owned natural resource.
4. Respect for the Terms of Property Agreements Applied
No significant treaties exist between Morocco and other states that might
provide a useful argument under this principle. The 1975 Madrid accords
between Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain cannot reasonably qualify as valid
international boundary orterritorial agreements. The accords themselves were
secret, and the only public agreement was a declaration of principles which
stated that Spain would withdraw from the territory by the end of February
1976.321 In reference to Morocco and Mauritania, the declaration mentioned
a temporary administration "in which Morocco and Mauritania will partici-
pate" along with the Spanish authorities.322 The declaration contained no
reference to the permanent division or sovereignty of the territory."z
316. Id. at 25-26.
317. Id at27tbl.1.
318. See id. at 27, 28 tbl.2 (discussing Moroccan exportation of phosphates).
319. Id at29.
320. See id at 27 tbl.1, 28 tbl.2 (providing figures showing virtual non-existence of
Western Sahara's import or export of phosphates). Even before Spanish decolonization,
Western Sahara's infrastructure was wholly incapable of exploiting the region's minerals. See
HODGES, supra note 308, at 128 (describing primitive infrastructure in 1960s). Problems
included insufficient water and electricity, lack of an administrative system, lack of any
adequate ports or roads, and an insufficient labor force. Id. Spain launched a development
program to build the required infrastructure in 1966. Id. Soon after fighting broke out between
Morocco and the Polisario, the infrastructure collapsed and phosphate production in Western
Sahara stopped. See id. at 284 (describing damage to Bu Craa's power lines and conveyer belt
that caused paralysis of phosphate mining).
321. See HODGES, supra note 308, at 223 (discussing Madrid accords).
322. See id at 223 (quoting "declaration of principles" that accompanied secret Madrid
accords).
323. See id at 223-24 ("Nothing was said about what would happen at the end of the
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The Libya-Chad case, however, offers a useful illustration of how such
an argument could work. Following an armed struggle over the boundary
issue, the Libyan government negotiated and signed the 1955 agreement with
France.324 That agreement specifically delimited the boundary between Chad
and Libya."2 According to the principles of the Islamic law of property, the
terms of the specific treaty determine the ownership of the land. Libya was
bound to respect the terms of the treaty and to take no more land than that
granted by the treaty.
26
V Conclusion
The end of the Cold War and the resurgence of non-Western cultural and
religious identities have called into question the validity and legitimacy of an
exclusively Western approach to international law. Governments and people
in the Islamic world now seek new Islamic solutions to international problems.
However, the traditional principles and concepts of the Siyar are simply
incompatible with the modem system of nation-states built on territorial
sovereignty. The principles discussed in this Note fill a small part of the void
left by the Siyar's inapplicability. They are compatible with the modem inter-
national order in that they recognize the reality of independent, sovereign
nation-states. Moreover, the principles are also substantively and legitimately
Islamic because they derive from the primary sources of Islamic law. This
approach offers a model for an issue by issue replacement of the outdated
Siyar. By addressing international issues as they arise, scholars eventually
may succeed in reconstructing a complete, workable, and modem system of
Islamic international law.
transitional period."). The declaration did not mention plans for permanent partition. Id.
324. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (describing history of 1955 agreement).
325. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing ICJ's interpretation of
1955 agreement).
326. See ABu ABID, supra note 226, at 211 (providing following prophetic tradition: "if
you make war against a people and they give up their wealth to your protection but without
submitting themselves ortheir sons, and they negotiate a peace with you, then take nothing from
them more than that, for verily more than that is not permitted you.").
